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PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION TO




Spousal assault' is a crime of momentous proportion in our soci-
ety.2 Yet in spite of the high incidence of this crime and its serious
* Permission of the author is required for reproduction. This article would have been
impossible without the many people working in the field and on the scholarship that appears
throughout the footnotes. I wish to extend personal thanks for their time to Sally Buckley,
Bebe Kivitz, Roberta Kuriloff, Lisa Lerman, and Maria Marcus. In addition, I am indebted
to friends including Barbara Goren, Michele Hirschman, and, most of all, Jack Litewka.
** J.D., Yale Law School, 1983; Graduate, Boston Family Institute, 1973; B.A., University
of California at Los Angeles, 1968.
1 The adjective "spousal" is used here because of the familiarity of the phrase "spousal
assault" or "spouse abuse," but it is not meant to imply that marriage is a prerequisite for
concern about violence in intimate relationships. One commentator has written that victims
of these assaults "include wives or women in any form of intimate relationships with men...
[but] it is important to note that battering relationships are more frequent among married
couples." L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN xv (1979).
Nor is the neutrality of the word "spousal" intended to obscure the fact that most com-
mentators agree that female victims are particularly vulnerable. Gelles notes that
there are men who are hit and injured by their wives. Perhaps as many wives hit their
husbands as are hit by their husbands. But the real issue is that the social position of
women in the family and society makes them much more vulnerable to the torment of
violence.
R. GELLES, FAMILY VIOLENCE 142 (1979). For a discussion of the controversy concerning the
frequency of wife versus husband battering, see J. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 326-29
(1979). Researcher Murray Straus has articulated nine ways in which the sexist organization
of society creates and maintains patterns of violence against women. See Straus, Sexua/Inequal-
ity, Cultural Norms and Wjze-Beating in VICTIMS AND SOCIETY 543 (E. Viano ed. 1976). In
order to accentuate the special vulnerability of women, this paper will use female pronouns or
nouns when referring to victims and male pronouns or nouns when referring to assailants or
defendants.
Unless otherwise indicated in text or footnotes, the word "assault" is not used as a term
of art, but is synonymous with the general term "abuse" and is intended to convey the idea of
physical or threatened physical attack of any sort, from pushing or shoving to stabbing or
shooting. The factual and legal nature of such "assaults" constitute the material of portions
of the dialogue which follows.
2 Estimates of the amount of spousal abuse in this country are imprecise because of the
lack of careful record keeping of reported cases and the (probable) large number of unre-
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repercussions for victims, 3 children of violent parents, 4 and society as a
whole,5 the response of the criminal justice system has been and contin-
ues to be reticent. Police seldom arrest offenders, 6 prosecutors seldom
prefer charges,7 and judges, when they have an opportunity to sentence
ported incidents. In an effort to establish a probability scale, one study was designed and
implemented with a random sample of 2,143 families. From this study, it was estimated that
one out of every six couples in the United States engage in at least one incident of vio-
lence each year. . . . Over the course of a marriage the chances are greater than one in
four (28%) that a couple will come to blows. . . . As with violence toward children, the
'milder' forms of violence are the most common. . . . Throwing an object, slapping,
spanking, pushing and grabbing.
R. GELLES, supra note I, at 92. The same study projected that "no fewer than 2 million
women are victims of severe physical violence each year." Id.
One commentator, with the help of the Center for Women Policy Studies in Washing-
ton, D.C., compiled a sample of recorded cases in a variety ofjurisdictions. That compilation
showed, for example, that in "1974, San Francisco Police reported that 50% of their calls were
for family disturbances," and, "[I]n Atlanta, 60% of all calls received on the night shift are
reported domestic disputes . J. " . FLEMING, supra note 1, at 330.
3 Victims of such assaults suffer a great variety of harms ranging from bruises and anxi-
ety to death. A 1973 FBI study shows that "one fourth of all murders occurred within the
family, and one-half of these were husband-wife killings." D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 14
(1976). Walker has recorded details of the sorts of injuries which are incurred by victims,
along with a number of case histories. See L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 78-106.
4 Children of violent parents suffer both physical and emotional harms. Fleming reports
an English study showing that in 50% of the "families where spouse abuse occurred, the chil-
dren were also involved in the violence." J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 331. For a description
of the emotional damage done to children in homes with violent spouses, see infta notes 48-49.
5 Society pays dearly for this violence. The costs include injuries (including death) to
both victims and police, the medical and police resources which must be devoted to the inci-
dents, and, possibly, a higher incidence of criminal violence generally. One study in progress
by Karen Seccombe, a doctoral student at Washington State University, reports that the
higher crime rate among women during the last ten years "can't be pinned on the feminist
movement-rather, . . . violence by men against women is the major factor. . . the most
common factor among women criminals is that they have either been battered by a husband
or a boyfriend or raped." Sloane, In Brief, National NOW Times, Nov., 1981 at 2, col. 3.
The violence is self-perpetuating as well. Gelles has found
that if a child is exposed to violence in the home and is the victim of parental violence,
that child is quite likely-as much as 1,000 times more likely than a child raised in a
nonviolent home-to grow up and use violence against a child or spouse. . . . Many a
battered wife has divorced her violent husband only to be the victim of her teenage
children's violence.
R. GELLES, supra note 1, at 142.
6 One commentator stated that the most common complaint heard from wife/victims is
that if and when the police arrive on the scene, they rarely do anything at all. D. MARTIN,
supra note 3, at 92. For numerous examples of official non-arrest policies of various police
departments, see id at 90-99; J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 171 ("in many cities it is difficult for
women being attacked by men they know. . . to get emergency police help."). But see IN-
TERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE TRAINING KEY 245, WIFE BEATING (ad-
vocating arrest). The importance of arrest has been demonstrated in a recent study. See infa
note 130.
7 One commentator noted, "Prosecutors are faulted as often as police for denying bat-
tered women access to the criminal courts. Only a fraction of the requests women make to
prosecutors for arrest warrants are granted." Gates, Victims of Rape and Wife Abuse, in WOMEN
IN THE COURTS 195 (1978); accord J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 199-200 (citing a study by
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at all, are lenient."
Although both the police and the judiciary make crucial independ-
ent choices concerning the treatment of these assaults, the prosecutorial
decision to charge is pivotal. A prosecutor who consistently refuses to
initiate a prosecution following an arrest will communicate to police
that these events are not to be treated as crimes and, accordingly, are
not worth valuable time and effort.9 Similarly, a prosecutor who never
brings a batterer before a judge, or who does so only rarely, will insulate
the judiciary from the fact of the frequency of these assaults.' 0
The legal tradition which permits the infrequent prosecution of
cases of spousal assault is the much criticized, yet almost universally fol-
lowed, concept of prosecutorial discretion to charge." The essence of
James Bannon, Executive Deputy Chief of Police, Detroit, which found that 92% of battered
women cases were not prosecuted); D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 110-15; Eisenberg & Micklow,
The Assaulted Wife.- 'Catch 22' Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S R. L. REP. 138, 158 (1977); Parnas,
Prosecutorial andJudicial Handling of Family Violence, 9 GRIM. L. BULL. 733, 735 (1973); Woods,
Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WOMEN'S R. L. REP. 12-13 (1978)("At present, men
correctly perceive that. . . even if they are arrested, they will not be ultimately punished for
their violence.").
With the help of grants from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), a
small number of prosecutors around the country have devised and maintained experimental
programs for the prosecution of cases of spousal assault. The results of this significant work
have been collected and described in L. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVA-
TIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (1981). This important work will be referred to
throughout this paper.
8 See, e.g., Gates, supra note 7, at 187-89 (discussing the "reluctance of judges to treat
serious assaults between couples as a crime"); accord A. BOYLAN & N. TAUB, ADULT DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE: CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE & EQUITABLE ISSUES, PART II, 116 (1981);
D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 114-18; Note, Wife Beating: Law & Society Confront the Castle
Door,15 GONZAGA L. REV. 171, 197 (1979); Center for Women Policy Studies, Washington,
D.C., Response to Violence in the Family, (Jan.-Feb. 1981).
9 For interesting material on police response to prosecutorial action or inaction in gen-
eral, see the classic work on the operation of discretion in the decisions of police, Goldstein,
Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process- Low-Visibilty Decision in the Administration of
Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 554 n.20 & 560 n.28 (1960). See id. at 575 n.67 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the police-prosecutor relationship in the handling of felonious assault
cases.
10 Although judges bring their own biases to these cases, see supra note 8 and accompany-
ing text, one prosecutor's office which has brought these cases regularly into court reports that
"[t]he Courts are becoming more willing to get involved with the cases and thus begin to
break the cycle of violence in the home." Euster, Statistics Summag for the Battered Women's
Project of the Seattle City Attornes Oftce 6 (1980).
11 The discretion to charge is virtually unfettered. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167
(5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F. 2d 234 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966), reh'g denied, 384 U.S. 967 (1968). But see Nader v.
Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 680 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discretion not a shield for arbitrariness). The
practice is followed by state as well as federal authorities. See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION 154
(1969) ("With rare exceptions, legislatures and appellate judges officially approve of this allo-
cation of power to prosecutors ... ).
The literature documenting the operation of this discretion and suggesting a variety of
means to curb it is voluminous. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188-214 (1969);
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this discretion is the prosecutor's power to choose not to initiate a prose-
cution, even in those cases in which sufficient evidence to support a con-
viction exists.12 A variety of reasons are given as justification for this
enormous grant of power to the prosecutor. Among these are the
problems of limited resources' 3 and outdated statutes,' 4 as well as the
need to evaluate each case individually.' 5 In the end, however, a prose-
A. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY
PLEA (1981); F. MILLER, supra, at 293-345; Abrams, Internal Poliy: Guiding the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971); Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecu-
lion, 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 770 (1933); Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement,
27 U. CHI. L. REv. 427 (1960); Bubany & Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Lawfor
Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473 (1976); Co. , Prosecutorial Discretion: An
Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383 (1976); Ferguson, Formulation of Enforcement Poliy: An
Anatomy of the Prosecutor's Discretion Pior to Accusation, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 507 (1956-57); Noll,
Controlling a Prosecutor's Screening Discretion Through Fuller Enforcement, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 697
(1978); Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521 (1981); Com-
ment,Justice Department's Prosecutorial Guidelines of Little Value to State and Local Prosecutors, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 955 (1981); Comment, prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Crimi-
nal Complaints, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 519 (1969); Note, Reviewability of Prosecutorial Discretion:
Failure to Prosecute, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 130 (1975); Note, Nonfeasance: A Threat to the Prosecutor's
Discretion, 30 IND. L.J. 74 (1954-55).
The American Bar Association (ABA) has prepared Standards for prosecutors to follow,
including Standard 3-3.9 Discretion in the Charging Decision, which will be referred to re-
peatedly in the dialogue which follows this introduction. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 3-1.1-6.2 (2d ed. 1980) (hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS).
For discussions of legal challenges or legislative responses to the infrequent prosecution of
cases of spousal assault in the context of the discretion to charge, see A. BOYLAN & N. TAUB,
supra note 8, at 281-88; Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 1657, 1699-1702 (1981); Blum, Memorandum on Prosecutorial Discretion (1981)(un-
published memorandum available through National Center on Women and Family Law,
Inc., New York); see also sufira note 7 and citations therein.
12 "The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support.
The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public
interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would
support a conviction. . . ." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9(b). As one commentator
notes, "The authority. . . to refuse to prosecute a complaint or indictment. . . is profound."
Lezak, The Prosecutor's Discretion-the Decision to Charge, in THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK 23
(1971).
13 See LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 533-34
(1970) ("No prosecutor has available sufficient resources to prosecute all of the offenses which
come to his attention"); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9 commentary at 3-56 ("Realis-
tically, there are not enough enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute every criminal
act that occurs").
14 The problem of outdated laws is part of the larger problem of overcriminalization. See
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9 commentary at 3-56 (referring to "breadth of criminal
legislation"). LaFave, supra note 13, at 533; Remington & Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and
the Leglislative Process, CURRENT PROB. CRIM. L. 481, 485-86 (1960) (noting confusion created
by failure to revise criminal codes and weed out "inconsistencies, overlapping provisions,
archaic language, and obsolete provisions").
15 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9 commentary at 3-56 ("The public inter-
est is best served and evenhanded justice best dispensed not by the mechanical application of
the 'letter of the law,' but by a flexible and individualized application of its norms thrdugh
the exercise of a prosecutor's thoughtful discretion."); LaFave, supra note 13, at 534.
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cutor's decision not to charge an individual or not to prosecute an entire
class of offenses may be based on criteria as unspecific as "the public
interest"' 6 or "the interests of the criminal justice system."' 7
The operation of discretion requires a society to trust the prosecu-
tor's good faith and ability to assess correctly the nature of the public
interest. This assessment is no easy task, however, in relation to spousal
assault. Our culture has a history of not only tolerating, but approving,
the striking of a wife by a husband. 18 In addition, there is a long-stand-
ing tradition of not intervening, particularly with the criminal process,
in what are often referred to as "family squabbles. ' 19 The pressure to
change this pattern of infrequent or non-prosecution is very recent,
20
and, in the absence of severe physical injury, many questio ns remain
about how the criminal justice system should treat these cases. Al-
though many decisions not to charge may be due to overt sexism,
2 1
many more may be the result of our society's confusion about the proper
role of the criminal justice system in relation to "minor violence" 22 in
families or intimate relationships.23
It .is not an answer, unfortunately, to say that it is the province of
the legislature to decide when the criminal process should be invoked.
Our system's acceptance of prosecutorial discretion means that a prose-
cutor must evaluate a legislative mandate in the light of specific facts
and the prosecutor's own perceptions of the public interest. Yet the mo-
16 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9 commentary at 3-56.
17 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND COALS,
COURTS, STANDARD 1.1 CRITERIA FOR SCREENING (1973), quoted in F. MILLER, R. DAWSON,
G. Dix & R. PARNAS, CASES & MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 827
(1976) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N].
18 For the history of a man's legal right to "chastise" his wife, see Eisenberg & Micklow,
supra note 7, at 138-39.
19 Id. at 145-46.
20 See, e.g., L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 2-8, for a description of the beginning of the
movement calling attention to the problem of spousal assault and its neglect by the criminal
justice system.
21 Some of the worst examples of sexist attitudes affecting prosecutorial decisionmaking
can be found in Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 7, at 158-59. These and other examples will
be explored in the dialogue which follows. Straus, supra note 1, at 554, gives the following
statement as one of the nine ways in which sexist attitudes maintain patterns of violence
against women: "9. Male Orientation of the Criminal justice System."
22 The phrase "minor violence" is taken from the Commentary to the ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 11, at 3-57 ("This discretion is commonly exercised in family conflicts where minor
violence occurs").
23 Fleming states that
Many [prosecutors] are truly confused about whether prosecution benefits battered wo-
men, but their main concern is making law enforcement and prosecution appear to work
in highly publicized criminal cases and those with unanimous condemnation. . . . The
American criminal-justice system has no definitive answers . . . to the questions about
what behavior is worthy of punishment. ...
J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 196-97.
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ment this discretion is permitted, many assumptions about these events
come into play. The prosecutor, as a member of a society which has
tolerated or ignored these events up until recently, is no less susceptible
to a variety of assumptions, attitudes and misperceptions than any other
citizen.2 4
The dialogue which follows is an exploration of possible responses
to a seemingly simple question: When should a family 'fight' which in-
volved physical force or the threat of physical force be treated as a fam-
ily 'crime'? It attempts to bridge the gap which now exists between
those who favor prosecution of cases of "minor violence" in families or
intimate relationships and those who do not, and the gap between the
language of a number of criminal statutes and the enforcement of those
statutes. We lack consensus concerning the criminality of domestic vio-
lence, and where there might be conviction we instead find
ambivalence.
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION TO CHARGE IN CASES OF
SPOUSAL ASSAULT: A DIALOGUE
QUESTIONER: We should begin by stating our respective positions.
I would have you initiate a prosecution in all cases of violence or
threatened violence in which the offender and victim are spouses or inti-
mates and in which there is probable cause 25 to believe that a criminal
statute has been violated.2 6
24 In discussing the kinds of offenses for which clear policies are needed "to maintain the
desired measure of consistency" of prosecution, Norman Abrams refers to "crime arising out
of intra-family squabbling." Abrams,supra note 11, at 11-12. He states, "The offenses on this
list usually have an element of controversy about them. There is often lacking a popular
consensus that enforcement should be one hundred percent or that the conduct should be
treated as a serious crime or, indeed, as a crime at all." Id.
25 Probable cause is the determination that "the facts and circumstances within [his]
knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to war-
rant a prudent man in believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an
offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Standard 3-3.9(a) of the ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 11, states that "[ilt is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute . . .
criminal charges when it is known that the charges are not supported by probable cause."
This Standard further provides as the test for charging that "[a] prosecutor should not insti-
tute. . . criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a convic-
tion." Id. If "support" is understood as "win," the prosecutor must believe there is "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute a crime," In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970), before instituting a charge. The Questioner in the dialogue would em-
ploy the less weighty probable cause standard.
26 Criminal codes vary from state to state and it is the responsibility of prosecutors to
enforce the law of their state. Hence, no specific statutes are named at this point. One com-
mentator has found that "[i]n most states the laws are adequate, but they are not enforced in
instances of family violence." Fields, Representing Battered Wives, 3 FAM. L. REP. 4025, 4028
(1977).
A number of state legislatures, perhaps in hopes of calling their desire for enforcement to
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PROSECUTOR: And I, for a variety of reasons, do not believe that
criminal prosecution is appropriate in all cases involving intimates or
spouses, particularly when the offense consists of no more than threats or
minor violence.
QUESTIONER: I must say that I find the expression 'minor vio-
lence' 27 anomalous, but that's neither here nor there. Can I assume that
you wouldn't refuse to charge in all cases involving spouses or intimates?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, you can. I'd certainly prosecute if a serious
case came to my attention.
QUESTIONER: You must tell me, then, how you decide that one
case is serious and another is not.
I. THE SERIOUS- PROSECUTOR: If there'd been an arrest,
NESS OF THE for example, felonious assault,28 I'd be con-
OFFENSE cerned and...
QUESTIONER: You learn of these cases after an arrest has been
made?29
PROSECUTOR: I get some victim complaints, but by and large I do
get these cases after an arrest, yes. 30
QUESTIONER: So a threshhold requirement of a serious case is that
the police consider it sufficiently serious to merit an arrest?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, there's a lot of screening done by the police.3 1
the attention of police and prosecutors, have "revised their criminal law regarding domestic
violence .... Substantive classification does not generally exclude possible application of the
ordinary criminal law, and more criminal justice procedures are the same than are different."
A. BOYLAN & N. TAUB, supra note 8, at 174.
27 See supra note 22.
28 For purposes of this dialogue, felonious assault will be defined in the same way in which
the Model Penal Code defines aggravated assault: "A person is guilty of aggravated assault if
he: (a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely,
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life. . . .(Proposed Official Draft 1962) MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2).
29 The source and type of information received by prosecutors vary enormously from ju-
risdiction to jurisdiction, as does the amount of screening done by police. See Y. KAMISAR,
W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16-17 (1980). For purposes of this
dialogue, a jurisdiction is envisioned in which the prosecutor receives reports of felony and
misdemeanor arrests and then screens those cases before a formal charge is filed.
30 Victim complaints could be initiated in two ways: (1) by the victims themselves with no
advice, or (2) by the victims on the suggestion of a police officer who felt that an arrest was
not appropriate, but that prosecution might be. This discrepancy is the result of the law of
arrest, which frequently precludes an arrest if an officer believes a misdemeanor did occur but
did not witness the crime. For a discussion of changes in arrest powers in cases of spousal
assault, see L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 119-33.
31 See supra note 6.
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QUESTIONER: And your next step?
PROSECUTOR: I'd consider the extent of the harm.32 Id want to
know whether there was serious physical injury.33
QUESTIONER: And is your reason for saying that you'd be con-
cerned about felonious assault the fact that serious physical injury is an
element of that offense?34
PROSECUTOR: That's correct.
QUESTIONER: So you're dependent, then, on the officer's judgment
concerning the severity of the injury as well as on his decision to arrest?
PROSECUTOR: That's the system and I have to work with its con-
straints. I get arrest reports; I'm not the one who goes out answering
calls.
QUESTIONER: I don't share your philosophy. I think you can work
with constraints or work to change constraints, but I don't want to talk
about your relationship with police right now. 35 What happens if you
get a report of a misdemeanor arrest, say a simple assault? 36
PROSECUTOR: It depends, but it's likely that I wouldn't charge.
QUESTIONER: Because that offense is likely to involve only minor
physical injury?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, though I would check to see whether there
were other indications of serious injury. There might, for example, be a
medical report.
32 The ABA STANDARDS include "the extent of the harm caused by the offense" as one
factor the prosecutor may consider in making his or her decision. ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 11, 3-3.9(b).
33 Seriousness of injury as a criterion for charging in cases of spousal assault is mentioned
in a variety of sources. See, e.g., J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 200; D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at
110, 112; Fromson, Responsibilities of the Prosecutor in Spouse Assault Cases, in U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PROSECUTOR'S RESPONSIBILITY IN SPOUSE ABUSE CASES 4 (1980); Note, supra note
8, at 196.
Similarly, seriousness of injury is a criterion for finding family violence criminal and
therefore transferable from Family Court to Criminal Court in New York State. See, e.g., In
the Matter of Montalvo v. Montalvo, 286 N.Y.S.2d 605, 55 Misc. 2d 699 (1968). Unfortu-
nately, not all prosecutors are as willing to consider charging, even when serious injury exists,
as the prosecutor in this dialogue. See supra note 7 and sources cited therein.
34 See subra note 28.
35 Improved communication and reporting between police and prosecutors have been
achieved in some of the experimental programs. See, e.g., L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 36-39.
36 For purposes of this dialogue, simple assault will be defined according to the MODEL
PENAL CODE'S definition: "(1) Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he: (a) attempts
to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or .. .
(c) attempts by physical menance to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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QUESTIONER: A medical report is an indication of seriousness?
PROSECUTOR: I think the existence of the report itself is a useful
indicator, yes. If an injury requires medical attention. .. 37
QUESTIONER: You mean if someone has decided that an injury re-
quires medical attention? 38
PROSECUTOR: I agree there's some subjectivity there, but reports
are useful. They not only have facts, but they provide corroboration.
QUESTIONER: You transmute fact into evidence quickly.
PROSECUTOR: I have to. It's my responsibility to prove an offense
has occurred.
QUESTIONER: But proving an offense has occurred is different from
deciding what offense, assuming probable cause, is worth proving.
Would you ever charge in a case in which there were no serious physical
injuries?
PROSECUTOR: Yes. We might get an assault with a deadly
weapon. 39 Say an assailant came at a victim with a gun or knife and
missed. There might be no injuries at all, but that's serious enough to
merit consideration for prosecution.4 0
QUESTIONER: To merit consideration?
PROSECUTOR: I'd have to evaluate all the facts. Do you want me
to make up an entire hypothetical for you?
QUESTIONER: Not now. I'm curious about that evaluation, but I
want to stick with this business about seriousness for a minute. In your
deadly weapon example, is seriousness a function of the weapon?
PROSECUTOR: Yes. You can kill or maim someone with a knife or
gun.
QUESTIONER: So it's the potentially serious physical injury which
concerns you?
37 In a study asking subjects to rank the seriousness of certain crimes, an injury which
resulted in the victim's receiving medical attention was rated as a "4," while a minor injury
"which does not require or receive professional medical attention" was given only a "1." See
M. WOLFGANG, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE 16-17 (1967).
38 It is known that in spouse abuse cases "[e]mbarrassment may inhibit a victim from
getting medical attention." Fromson, supra note 33, at 13.
39 The MODEL PENAL CODE defines aggravated assault as follows: "(b) attempts to cause
or purposely or knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly
weapon." MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (2b).




PROSECUTOR: That's a fair statement.
QUESTIONER: It brings us back, however, to the same notion of se-
riousness. In both examples, it's serious physical injury, though one is
actual and the other potential.
PROSECUTOR: Uh huh.
QUESTIONER: What is the significance to you of a serious physical
injury?
PROSECUTOR: The answer seems so obvious, I'm not sure I under-
stand your question.
QUESTIONER: I'm trying to understand both your emphasis on
physical injury and your concern with severity.
PROSECUTOR: Physical? Physical injury's the most apparent
thing, the most upsetting thing.
QUESTIONER: Apparent physical injury is the most apparent thing.
PROSECUTOR: True.
QUESTIONER: So it's the emotional impact of physical injury?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, it frightens people, and with no reason. It's in-
vasive, it may be life endangering.
QUESTIONER: And when we're frightened we move more quickly to
condemn the behavior that generated the result that upsets us?41
PROSECUTOR: I think so, yes.
QUESTIONER: And when the physical injury is not severe it is less
evocative and therefore we're slower to condemn?
PROSECUTOR: I think it's true that people don't care as much.
They may not worry about the next time in the same way they would if
there were severe injury.
QUESTIONER: In spite of the fact that it may be the same act which
in one case causes severe injury and, in another, little or no physical
injury? 42
41 The language of criminal law conveys the relationship between that law and our fears
in its use of the word apprehend. (We apprehend when we are apprehensive.)
42 That the relationship between act and result is a complex one is demonstrated by
§ 2.03 of the MODEL PENAL CODE: "Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result; Di-
vergence Between Result Designed or Contemplated and Actual Result or Between Probable
and Actual Result." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03, reprintedin J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITL
& R. SCHWARTL, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROCESS 733 (1974).
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PROSECUTOR: I think it's valid to assume that serious injury is gen-
erally the result of a serious or more serious act...
QUESTIONER: I'm not sure I agree . . .43
PROSECUTOR: . . . and it's also true that it's difficult to react to
what you can't see.
QUESTIONER: Yet you admit there can be serious unseen injuries?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, there may be serious internal injuries.44
QUESTIONER: Or serious external injuries which are not readily
visible.45
PROSECUTOR: Is that common in these cases?
QUESTIONER: Yes. Or terrible fear.46 And you're unlikely to see
the harm done to the children of such families.
PROSECUTOR: Do you really think seeing a minor assault harms
children?
QUESTIONER: I think they are harmed, yes, 47 and that they learn.48
And you can't see the injury which was never reported or the one which
hasn't occurred.
43 See infra text accompanying note 99.
44 See L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 223 ("The second category [of battered women's inju-
ries] is internal injuries which cause bleeding and malfunctioning of organs").
45 T. DAVIDSON, CONJUGAL CRIME 32 n.* (1978) ("Inflicting nonvisible injuries (at least
nonfacial ones) seems to be a specialty of many of the middle-class wifebeaters coming to my
attention."). But see id. at 33 ("Despite the men's knowledge of inflicting nonvisible injuries,
most . . . attacked the head most frequently and then the face"); accord Eisenberg & Dillon,
Medico-Legal Aspects of Representing the Battered Woman, 5 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 645, 649
(1980).
46 Terror may be manifested by less observable physical symptoms such as "acute anxiety
attacks resulting in heart palpitations, hyperventilation .. " L. WALKER, supra note 1 at
224; accordJ. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 88 ("Agitation and anxiety bordering on panic...").
47 There is now a substantial body of evidence indicating the harm done to children in
homes with violent parents. For example, Walker states: "Impressive data, however, demon-
strate that children who live in a battering relationship experience the most insidious form of
child abuse. Whether or not they are physically abused by either parent is less important
than the psychological scars they bear from watching their fathers beat their mother .. "
See also L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 149-50 (Walker does not limit her definition of battering
to severe physical assaults, but includes less severe assaults and psychological harms. Much of
her book is devoted to an elucidation of the nature of "battering."); see also id. at 276 ("Older
male children were aggressive, easily frustrated and engaged in disruptive behavior. . . . Fe-
male children were likely to become 'withdrawn, passive, clinging and anxious.' "); D. MAR-
TIN, supra note 3, at 23 ("Children who 'merely' witness physical violence between their
parents suffer emotional trauma.').
48 See R. GELLES, supra note 1, at 142 (indicating the learned behavior involved in spouse
abuse); see also supra note 5.
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PROSECUTOR: What do you mean?
QUESTIONER: You may be seeing an isolated example of assault in
what is in fact a pattern of repeated behavior.49
PROSECUTOR: You're not suggesting that I should prosecute some-
one for a crime they may some day commit?
QUESTIONER: No, I'm not. I'm suggesting that you ought to con-
sider prosecuting a person for the crime they did commit in spite of the
fact that it does not meet your serious physical injury standard, and I'm
offering up two utilitarian reasons for doing so. The harm may be more
serious than you perceive, and you may be able to disrupt a pattern of
behavior before more serious physical harm, including homicide, is
done.50
49 In a sample of 2,143 families, researchers discovered that "for about half the couples the
pattern is that if there is one beating, there are likely to be others. . . violence. . . when it
occurs, tends to be a recurrent feature of the marriage." M. STRtus, R. GELLES & S. STEIN-
METZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 41-42 (1981). A recent two-year study by the Institute for
Social Analysis showed that "[m]ore than a quarter of the victims of family violence suffered
repeated problems from the same person for months or even years after the original
case. . . ." A Study of Pattemrs in Family Violence, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1983, at C14, cols. 3-4.
A fact of particular concern to prosecutors is the finding, in another study, that there is a
correlation between frequency of violence and the type of intervention sought by victims.
This study found that "[w]omen hit weekly to daily are most likely to call the police, while
women hit less often. . . are more inclined to get a divorce or legal separation." R. GELLES,
supra note 1, at 100.
50 Raymond Parnas recommends that the criminal justice system intervene in cases of
minimal violence, referring to "[a]ll of the data showing the . . . experience of escalation
from minimal to aggravated injury. . . ." See Parnas, The Relevance of Criminal Law to Inter-
Spousal Violence, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 190 (J. Eekelaar & S. Katz eds. 1978). Parnas is a
pioneer in the study of the criminal justice system's handling of cases of spousal assault. See
generally Parnas, supra note 7. His recommendation is particularly telling in light of the fact
that his early research was spurred by a belief in the need to "effectively [divert] cases from
the criminal process." Id. at 755. He now advocates a "tradition response of arrest, prosecu-
tion and sanction . . . not only at the upper levels of violence, but also at the first minimal
signs of trouble." Parnas, supra, at 191.
There is no consensus among those commentators who favor more prosecution of cases
involving severe injury concerning the prosecution of "minor violence" cases. For example,
Fleming recommends that
[a]dvocates should take care to concentrate their efforts on the most serious cases of
abuse, which, if unprosecuted, are most likely to result in even more serious harm to the
battered woman. Insisting on prosecution of every single case is unrealistic and not in
the best interest of many victims.
J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 200. Although this writer would agree that it is important not to
neglect the most serious cases, it does not necessarily follow that it is essential to concentrate
on those cases at the (possible) expense of the less serious ones. In fact, insofar as the impor-
tance-of-concentrating-on-more-serious-cases position is based on an expectation of the in-
creased severity of future assaults, it would seem more desirable to intervene sooner rather
than later in a possible pattern of abuse. It is important to recognize, furthermore, that an
insistence on the importance of prosecuting cases of minor injury is not the same as an insis-
tence on prosecuting every single case. Prosecutors who wish to attempt new ways of dealing
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But it's not only practical considerations that divide us. I suspect
we have many different attitudes toward these events, and I want to
learn more about how you decide whether to charge. Could we go back
to our assault with a deadly weapon example? You said you'd have to
evaluate various factors.
PROSECUTOR: Yes. My decision would depend a great deal on my
sense of the victim.5'
QUESTIONER: How so?
PROSECUTOR: Assuming that I believed her myself,52 I'd want to
consider her ability to convince a judge or jury that she was telling the
truth. Assault with a deadly weapon is an "attempt" offense 53 and at-
tempts are tough to prove. I'm assuming, by the way, that I can't count
on witnesses in making my decision.
QUESTIONER: No, I wish you'd assume you did have witnesses.
Otherwise, we'll get caught up in the question of proof again.
PROSECUTOR: Wait a minute. You need to understand that likeli-
hood of conviction is the first tenet of any charging decision.54
with these cases may have, depending on the number of cases which come to their attention,
difficult choices to make concerning resources and priorities. That reality is not, however, a
reason for diminishing the significance of early intervention.
Fleming's concern about victims introduces the complex issue of the relationship be-
tween the decision to prosecute and the needs and/or desires of victims. Various aspects of
this issue are touched upon throughout this dialogue.
51 A prosecutor's "sense of the victim" has many variations in the classic rationales for
infrequent or non-prosecution of these cases. See, e.g., Micklow & Eisenberg, supra note 7, at
158 ("The focus in each instance is whether the victimized wife is perceived as a 'worthy'
victim deserving of both the prosecutor's and courts' efforts.").
On the other hand, the difficulties of victim testimony are real. Prosecutors must work to
devise means of preparing victim-witnesses in order that they have less chance of presenting a
victim who "takes the stand and is so frightened that she becomes unable to speak or to give
coherent testimony." L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 23. A variety of solutions to this problem
are available. See id. at 44-55.
52 One of the first obstacles that victims encounter in the criminal justice system is that
law enforcement officials "do not believe the victim." Woods, supra note 7, at 10.
53 See supra note 39.
54 See supra note 25. The sentence requiring "sufficient admissible evidence to support a
conviction" is "new" according to the History of Standard, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11,
at 3-54. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, how-
ever, does not consider it a new criterion: "An accused should be screened out of the criminal
justice system if there is not a reasonable likelihood that the evidence admissible against him
would be sufficient to obtain a conviction and sustain it on appeal." NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMM'N, supra note 17, STANDARD 1. 1 CRITERIA FOR SCREENING.
This dialogue takes place in a jurisdiction in which the likelihood of conviction is a basic
criterion for charging. Recent research indicates that different prosecutorial styles place vary-
ing emphasis on the likelihood of conviction as an initial screening devise. Mellon, Jacoby
and Brewer identify four "basic policy types or models: Legal Sufficiency, System Efficiency,
Trial Sufficiency, and Defendant Rehabilitation." Mellon, Jacoby & Brewer, The Prosecutor
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QUESTIONER: Is that the reason you feel you must think about the
effect of the victim on someone other than yourself?
PROSECUTOR: That's right.
QUESTIONER: But doesn't conviction depend in part on your abil-
ity to convince a judge or jury that a crime has been committed?
PROSECUTOR: Yes.
QUESTIONER: And isn't your ability to persuade likely to be af-
fected by your own perception of the victim?
PROSECUTOR: Yes.
QUESTIONER: So we can't really begin to determine either the like-
lihood of conviction or whether you think that you should charge, given
probable cause, without knowing more about how you perceive the
victim.
PROSECUTOR: That's true.
QUESTIONER: Or the victim's injuries.
PROSECUTOR: You're implying that I'm concerned with the seri-
ousness of the injuries because of my evaluation of the effect on others?55
QUESTIONER: Which is based, in turn, on its effect on you. Yes, I
was wondering if that wasn't part of your concern.
PROSECUTOR: I'm not sure what I think about that. I will tell you,
however, that these cases are notoriously difficult to prosecute, and that
fact affects my charging decision.56
QUESTIONER: Difficult to win?
PROSECUTOR: Difficult to win.
QUESTIONER: I see we'll have to talk about this business of likeli-
hood of conviction at some point, but I have one more question about
serious injuries. You gave me an example of a case in which you might
charge where there were no injuries but you also said you probably
Constrained by His Environment: A New Look at DiscretionayJustice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 59 (1980). Brooklyn was studied and classified as a System Efficiency
model. Id. at 62-65.
Whatever the across-the-board policy in relation to likelihood of conviction, the evidence
is clear that this criterion is applied almost invariably to cases of spousal assault. See, e.g., J.
FLEMING, supra note 1, at 200; D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 110, 112; FROMSON,supra note 33,
at 4.
55 See subra note 41 and accompanying text.
56 The prosecutor's observations about the difficulties of these cases are quite correct. See
L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 22.
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wouldn't prosecute a misdemeanor case. Would you ever prosecute a
case of minor violence involving spouses or intimates?
PROSECUTOR: I won't say absolutely not, but it's not likely, and I
certainly wouldn't prosecute as many cases as I imagine you'd like.
QUESTIONER: And are you more apt to prosecute cases with minor
injuries if the participants are strangers than if they have a relationship?
PROSECUTOR: Yes,5 7 and there are good reasons for that.
QUESTIONER: Good. It's your reasons that interest me. Why don't
we put the issue of seriousness aside for now, and you can tell me how
you think about these cases.
II. STATE INTER- PROSECUTOR: Fine. To begin with, I
VENTION IN don't think the State should be quick to inter-
INTIMATE RE- vene in family arguments. 58
LATIONSHIPS
QUESTIONER: You use the word 'argument'. What about family
'assaults'?
PROSECUTOR: That's more troubling, I agree, but if the assault is
minor, then prosecution may make things worse rather than better.
59
QUESTIONER: Worse for whom?
PROSECUTOR: For the couple.60
57 For a summary of the studies indicating a greater likelihood of prosecution of "stran-
ger" assault cases than "prior relationship" cases ("prior relationship" frequently is a euphe-
mism for family or intimate relationship), see L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 24-29. Numerous
other examples of policies of less prosecution in relationship than in stranger assaults can be
found in Parnas, supra note 7.
A Bronx Case Evaluation Form, designed to measure "the seriousness of the case for
prosecution" is a striking example of this differentation. This form quantifies various factors
for purposes of screening. Scores are all positive, ranging from 1.3 ("intimidation") to 18.7
("defendant with more than one felony conviction"), with the exception of the score for "vic-
tim and defendant-same family" which is assigned a negative value of 2.8! Bronx Case Eval-
uation Form, reproduced in J. JACOBY, PRE-TRIAL SCREENING IN PERSPECTIVE 38-39 (1976).
A recent study of the handling of these cases by the Manhattan District Attorney's office
indicates that, in cases charged, the existence of a prior relationship means there is a greater
likelihood of charge reduction (from felony to misdemeanor assault) than in stranger assault
cases. See Piior Links to Victim Cited in Reducing of Felonies, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at B6,
col. 3.
58 For an excellent discussion on the "societal interest in marital privacy" and its pecu-
liarly chameleon character, see A. BOYLAN & N. TAUB, supra note 8, at 60-69. This privacy
interest is not limited to marriage, although that institution defines the concept's legal
boundaries.
59 The notion of making things worse, as will be demonstrated, extends to concerns about
the relationship per se, the defendant and the victim.




PROSECUTOR: What if they want to make up their differences
later? I'd think a criminal prosecution by one against the other would
make a reconciliation almost impossible.61
QUESTIONER: In what way?
PROSECUTOR: Well, the defendant isn't apt to be feeling concilia-
tory toward someone who is prosecuting him.
QUESTIONER: Toward you?
PROSECUTOR: I meant toward the victim.62
QUESTIONER: Then the defendant is not too apt to be wanting to
make up differences, as you say. Is that what you meant?
PROSECUTOR: Yes.
QUESTIONER: Then "they" are not going to be wanting to make up
and we have no problem.
PROSECUTOR: Look. What if the defendant would like to continue
the relationship, but feels that as a matter of pride he can't remain in-
volved with someone who is willing to send him to jail?
QUESTIONER: Then your defendant is going to have to choose be-
tween his pride and his love. Is that really the State's concern?
PROSECUTOR: No, but it becomes a concern if it's the victim who
wants to make up and who may feel that if she testifies...
QUESTIONER: That the defendant may choose his pride instead of
her?
PROSECUTOR: . . .You're making a complicated situation into
black and white. The relationship may be tenuous. The testimony may
tip the scales.63
an inevitably continuing relationship. Prosecutors prefer that the solution of the difficulties
be an amicable one." F. MILLER, supra note 11, at 267; accord L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 16.
61 "[Tlhe state should be properly hesitant to interfere in a marital squabble. Bringing a
marital assault into court may prolong and intensify marital disagreements, solidify hostili-
ties, and convert unpleasant memories into permanent grudges." Lobsenz, Prosecutorial Man-
agement of the Uncooperative Victim-Witness, 15 GRIM. L. BULL. 301, 306 (1980).
62 It is interesting to note that this prosecutor's perspective of the victim's role in the
prosecution shifts depending on whether the concern is interference with the relationship (vic-
tim as prosecutor) or vindictiveness of victim (state as prosecutor). For the latter perspective,
see infra text accompanying notes 88-91.




QUESTIONER: Isn't that a choice for the victim?
PROSECUTOR: But if I can predict that the victim will drop out
and not testify, then why should I charge in the first place?
QUESTIONER: Because you're a public official and by not charging
you convey the idea that the State is willing to tolerate such assaults.
PROSECUTOR: My point is that I think tolerance may be in the
public interest.
QUESTIONER: Who is the public? 64
PROSECUTOR: All of us. The society.
QUESTIONER: You? Me? We disagree. The victim? The defend-
ant? They have different interests.
PROSECUTOR: I would say that in general our society would prefer
to try to help keep the relationship intact than to prosecute a minor
offense. 65
QUESTIONER: So you weigh all the different interests and you come
up with an unnamed "in general" rather than the interests of the victim
or of anyone else who might desire a prosecution?
PROSECUTOR: You make it sound as if I'm disregarding the victim.
QUESTIONER: You make it sound as if you're disregarding the
victim.
PROSECUTOR: You're oversimplifying again. All I'm saying is that
if I have two choices, and one may preserve or help preserve the rela-
tionship and the other may harm or help destroy the relationship, I
think that most people would be more likely to opt for the former.
QUESTIONER: We're going in circles. I wonder if I'm misunder-
64 Abrams suggests that "[v]arious factors might influence a prosecutor to adopt a prac-
tice of nonprosecution. Opposition by the community might be such a ground. Immediately,
of course, the question must be raised, 'which community?'" Abrams, supra note 11, at 15
(footnote omitted).
65 The Chief Prosecutor of Washtenaw County, Michigan, exhibited an extreme version
of this attitude in an interview with Eisenberg & Micklow: "Does the time-honored concept,
the sanctity of marriage, override society's interest in the enforcement of the criminal law? I
think that the sanctity of marriage is more sacred than the criminal law and the one-punch
fight . . . It overrides the criminal code." Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 7, at 158. A
more subtle version of the same rationale is found in one of the reasons for Family Court
(rather than Criminal Court) jurisdiction over assaults (including felonious assaults) involving
family members: "[I]t is true that the primary purpose of family offense jurisdiction is to help
the family rather than the individual." In The Matter of Montalvo v. Montalvo, 286
N.Y.S.2d 605, 611, 55 Misc. 2d 699, 704 (1968).
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standing part of your meaning. Could we go over what we've just
discussed?
PROSECUTOR: All right.
QUESTIONER: Didn't we agree that if both victim and defendant
want to continue the relationship, then it will continue?
PROSECUTOR: Yes.
QUESTIONER: And that it's only if the relationship is "tenuous," as
you say, that we need to worry?
PROSECUTOR: Yes.
QUESTIONER: But a tenuous relationship means that either the vic-
tim or the defendant or both have doubts or may not desire the
relationship?
PROSECUTOR: Right.
QUESTIONER: And didn't we agree that their doubts or their desires
are their business, not the business of the State?
PROSECUTOR: Depends on what you mean by "not the business of
the State."
QUESTIONER: It's their choice and they alone have control over
those decisions.
PROSECUTOR: Yes, but if we tilt the choice one way or the other,
then it becomes the State's business.
QUESTIONER: One way or the other?
PROSECUTOR: Yes.
QUESTIONER: To help the relationship or to harm it?
PROSECUTOR: That's right.
QUESTIONER: And we would favor the relationship by not
charging?
PROSECUTOR: Uh huh.
QUESTIONER: Which means that a decision favoring the relation-
ship favors the defendant over the victim.
PROSECUTOR: How so?
QUESTIONER: First, the victim has been harmed and nothing has
happened to the defendant. Second, the victim will have to learn to




PROSECUTOR: But she'll only have to cope, as you say, if she wants
us to prosecute.
QUESTIONER: She's harmed whether she wants prosecution or not.
But go ahead. What if the victim does want you to prosecute?
PROSECUTOR: I'd still hesitate.
QUESTIONER: Why?
PROSECUTOR: Because the victim will change her mind in most
cases. I told you, she'll drop out.6 7
QUESTIONER: But if your concern is the relationship I see no prob-
lem if the victim drops out.
PROSECUTOR: It isn't my job to initiate prosecutions that come to
nothing.
QUESTIONER: So the concern isn't only a need to avoid making a
choice which you think may harm the relationship. 68 It's also concern
about the potential conflict between that need and your need as prose-
cutor to complete a prosecution successfully. Is that right?
PROSECUTOR: There's a conflict there, yes.
QUESTIONER: I feel haunted by your need for convictions.
PROSECUTOR: That's not my only reason for shying away from
these cases. I'm not sure that we should treat minor assaults, let alone
menacing words or threats, 69 in relationships as crimes.
66 This point has been made in slightly different ways by both D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at
116, and A. BOYLAN & N. TAUB, supra note 8, at 69 ("But, where the partners conflict, the
state is incapable of protecting that relation; in choosing whether or not to act, the state
inevitably aligns itself with one partner or the other.").
67 Se infra text accompanying notes 115-26.
68 Walker's research indicates that concert over maintaining relationships in which vio-
lence has occurred is misguided: "The best hope for such couples is to terminate the relation-
ship. There is a better chance that with another partner they can reorder the power structure
and as equals can live in a nonviolent relationship." L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 29.
69 "Menacing" may be an element of simple assault, see supra MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 211.1(c), or it may be a separate offense. For example, the Seattle City Code defines "men-
acing" as follows:
(1)(a) by physical action he intentionally causes or attempts to cause another person
reasonably to fear imminent serious bodily injury or death; or (b) by a present threat to
another person subsequent to a history of threats or violence between himself and such
other person, he intentionally causes or attempts to cause such other person reasonably
to fear serious bodily injury or death.
SEATTLE, WASH., Crrv CODE § 12A.04.050(1973). The significance of threats in relation to
possible injury should not be underestimated. A study of domestic violence in Kansas City
"revealed that violence was preceded by threats in 50 to 80 percent of the cases, and the
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QUESTIONER: I know. That's why we're talking.
PROSECUTOR: People in relationships get upset with one another.
There's lots of emotion, people sometimes lose control. 70 I don't want to
live in a society which picks up every person who's gotten upset and
swung at someone and puts them through a prosecution.
QUESTIONER: I'm not sure that I'm following you.
PROSECUTOR: I'm saying that I feel uneasy about your recommen-
dation that there be a prosecution in every case. It sounds as if you
want to run a sort of police state with a cop running in to make arrests
in every family fight.71
QUESTIONER: I don't desire a police state either. Nor do I under-
stand what a police state has to do with what I'm saying.
PROSECUTOR: If every time a man hits his wife or his housemate
QUESTIONER: You have to prosecute?
PROSECUTOR: Or the police arrive at the door and make an arrest.
It's frightening.
QUESTIONER: But how do they get to the door?
PROSECUTOR: What do you mean?
QUESTIONER: Well, you mentioned police states. Do you imagine
that I'm recommending the streets be filled with police who go into
every home checking to see whether some man has just hit his wife?
PROSECUTOR: No, you're exaggerating.
QUESTIONER: I'm not exaggerating, I'm asking. How do the police
get to the door?
PROSECUTOR: Someone calls them.
QUESTIONER: And that someone is apt to be either the victim or a
witness, is that right?
[companion] Detroit study confirmed the importance of threats as a predictor of violence.
The Detroit data revealed that '53 out of 90 homicides involving family members were pre-
ceded by threats."' J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 333.
Nor should the significance of threats in the absence of later violence be diminished. As
with assaults resulting in minor physical injury, threats can cause much suffering in and of
themselves. See supra note 46 and infa notes 113, 117 and accompanying text.
70 See in/ia notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
71 This concern was expressed by a Yale Law student in a personal conversation with the
writer of this paper.
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PROSECUTOR: Probably the victim.
QUESTIONER: So the victim has asked the police to enter her home.
She's opened the door to the State in effect.
PROSECUTOR: Yes, but...
QUESTIONER: But?
PROSECUTOR: It doesn't follow that she wants a prosecution. She
may have asked the State to intervene because she was frightened. 72
QUESTIONER: That seems plausible. Are you saying, then, that you
want to consider the victim's purpose in calling the police before you
initiate a prosecution?
PROSECUTOR: Yes.
III. IMAGES OF QUESTIONER: All right. Let's talk about
THE VICTIM: the effect of the victim's purpose or motive73
MOTIVES, on your decision whether to charge.
DESIRES, AND
NEEDS
PROSECUTOR: To begin with, I'm disturbed by your leap from
frightened victim to prosecution.
QUESTIONER: I agree that there's a leap here. In fact there are a
number of leaps here. For example, you began by saying that the victim
might have contacted the police out of fear...
PROSECUTOR: Yes.
QUESTIONER: . . . and you then assumed that because she was
afraid, her reason for contacting the police was to get protection.74
PROSECUTOR: That's right.
72 There is general agreement that victims seek intervention because they are, "at the very
least, frightened." D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 13.
73 "Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may consider [are] .. . possible im-
proper motives of a complainant." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, 3-3.9(b) (iv). The notion
of motive is therefore formally introduced into the prosecutor's deliberations. Impropriety,
the justification for this consideration of victim motivation, as opposed to motive per s, is
discussed infra note 86, and accompanying text. See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N, supra
note 17, Standard 1.17 ("Any improper motives of the complainant").
74 It is commonly believed that a victim's fear (motive in the sense of emotion, drive)
means that she contacted the police for protection (motive in the sense of goal or purpose).
See, e.g., Hamlin, The Nature and Extent of Spouse Assault in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECU-
TOR'S RESPONSIBILITY IN SPOUSE ABUSE CASES 8 (1980) ("A call to the police is often a call
only to have an outside authority figure stop the beatings"). Another assumption that is
made about these cases is that the victim wants authorities to somehow repair a disintegrating
relationship. See, e.g., A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 72 ("In cases of domestic violence...
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QUESTIONER: And you then decide that because prosecution won't
serve that assumed purpose, which is itself an assumption, that you
shouldn't charge. Correct?
PROSECUTOR: You can't ignore the fact that prosecution may
make things worse for the victim. 75
QUESTIONER: How so?
PROSECUTOR: If it angers the defendant, he may hurt her again.76
QUESTIONER: If you don't prosecute, he may hurt her again.
PROSECUTOR: But the danger isn't as immediate. I can't feel right
about going ahead if I think it may set off another assault.
QUESTIONER: The danger may be more immediate if you do noth-
ing.77 But either way, the problem of danger to the victim points to a
need to help ensure her safety, not a need not to charge. Don't you have
options? Aren't there shelters in your community? Can't you assist her
in getting a protective order?78
PROSECUTOR: I can try, but there's a lack of shelters.
QUESTIONER: I hope you've brought that fact to the attention of
the public. 79 Assuming that the victim has somewhere to go or can be
the criminal complaint is often a call for official help in deteriorating relationships, not for
criminal prosecution").
Whatever the validity of either vision of the victim's reasons for calling the police, it is
important not to allow such assumptions to obscure the need to ask what Raymond Parnas
calls the "basic question," to wit, "what response, if any, should the legal system make after
the dispute has been halted by police intervention?" Parnas, supra note 50, at 190.
75 It is essential that prosecutors work to differentiate those concerns for the victim which
are paternalistic (and may, therefore, mask underlying biases) and those which are based on
actual needs that the victim may have. One of these needs-the need for safety-is touched
on at this point. For a discussion of other victim needs, see infra note 117.
For an example of prosecutorial paternalism, see Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 7, at
158.
76 It is an irony that the requirement that victim-witnesses disclose their addresses to pros-
ecutors, who may then give these addresses to the charged assailant's attorneys (who may, in
turn, give them to assailants) is one factor that increases the danger to a victim who chooses to
prosecute. See D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 113.
77 Insofar as there is a connection between police refusal to arrest (or to impress upon the
mind of an assailant that assault is a crime) and prosecutorial reluctance to charge, the prose-
cutor may have to share in the blame for renewed violence immediately following the depar-
ture of the police from the home. The threat of post-conviction danger has also been given as
reason for nonprosecution of spousal assault cases. For a response to this rationale, see
Parnas, supra note 50, at 191.
78 This Article does not address the important issue of victim safety. For more informa-
tion on this topic, see, e.g., A. BoYLAN & N. TAUB, supra note 8; L. LERMAN, supra note 7.
79 For an example of a prosecutor who has brought this problem to the attention of the
public, see the comments of Ruth Nordenbrook, Assistant County Prosecutor, King County,
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made safe, would you still not prosecute?
PROSECUTOR: The point I was trying to make is that prosecution
wasn't the reason the victim called the police, yet the call to the police is
what you've offered as justification for the State's intruding in the form
of prosecution.
QUESTIONER: Now, wait, because I am assuming that a crime has
been committed. Are you saying that the State should only prosecute if
the victim called the police with prosecution in mind?
PROSECUTOR: You wait a minute. You're contradicting yourself.
First you seemed to be implying that I wasn't concerned enough with
the victim's desires. Now you seem to be suggesting that I ignore those
desires.
QUESTIONER: I'm not suggesting that at all. I'm trying to under-
stand what significance the victim's reasons have in your decision-mak-
ing. Do the State and the victim have to have purposes which coincide?
PROSECUTOR: Not necessarily, but it's a difficult problem when
they don't. Which would you have me choose?
QUESTIONER: You know my bias. I would say your job is to en-
force the laws.
PROSECUTOR: And I'd say that my job is to consider all the factors,
including the victim's feelings, and then make an enforcement decision.
QUESTIONER: We can agree that your job includes both tasks80
But you must begin with either a concern about enforcing a given law or
the need to weigh all factors.
PROSECUTOR: It comes out the same either way.
QUESTIONER: The way it comes out may be a function of the em-
phasis you place on either task. If you begin by considering the victim's
feelings, and here you assume they are against prosecution or at least not
for prosecution, then you may go no further in your deliberations. If
you start by deciding that it's important to enforce the laws against as-
sault, your view of the victim's role may take on a different significance.
Seattle, Washington, in Vitims of Crime or Victims ofjrustice? 2 (Aug. 10, 1977) (Program Spon-
sored by ABA Section on Criminal Justice, Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois).
80 See the ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, Standard 3-1.1 at 3-6, describe the function of
the prosecutor: "(b) The prosecutor is both an administrator of justice and an advocate. The
prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her functions." The
administrator function is described in the Commentary: "[T]he prosecutor acts as a decision
maker on a broad policy level and . . . also has responsibility for deciding whether to bring
charges .. " Id. at 3-7.
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PROSECUTOR: That may be. One way or the other, though, I'll
still have to evaluate all the factors.
QUESTIONER: Go ahead, then, and evaluate.
PROSECUTOR: What I started to say before is that I don't feel com-
fortable with the idea of taking over and prosecuting if the victim's re-
quest for help was meant to be no more than a call for protection.
QUESTIONER: Let me ask you something. Is it true that in all cases
in which a victim's purpose in calling the police or coming in to report a
crime is to obtain protection, rather than to see someone prosecuted,
that you'd decide not to prosecute?
PROSECUTOR: I don't assign the same weight in all cases to the
victim's desires, no.8'
81 The prosecutor shifts the discussion at this point from a consideration of the possible
discrepancy between the prosecutor's task and the victim's reasons for calling the police to a
consideration of the weight to be assigned to the victim's desires with regard to whether to
prosecute. This shift is possible because of the (commonly made) assumption that the victim
does not want to prosecute. See supra note 74.
There is disagreement among those persons who have worked extensively with spouse
abuse cases, and who favor prosecution of those cases, concerning the issue of the role of the
victim's wishes in the decision whether to charge. See L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 42-43. This
study of experimental programs describes three programs (Santa Barbara, Philadelphia, and
Westchester County, New York) in which charges are filed "only if evidence is sufficient and
the victim wishes to participate." Id. at 42 (emphasis in original). The Los Angeles City
Attorney's Office does not ask the victim's wishes, but makes the decision whether to charge
on the basis of the prosecutor's own evaluation of the case. Seattle, Washington, prosecutors
file charges automatically when an arrest has been made, but only if the victim elects a prose-
cution when there has been no arrest. Id. at 42-43.
Differences between these policies, however, may be more apparent than real. There are
different situations in each office which call for or require different treatment of victims; these
differing situations may be more determinative of the victim-wish policy than any special
political or psychological vision of the victims of spousal assaults. For example, in New York
there is a legal requirement that victims be advised "of their 'right of election,' that is their
right to choose which court their case will be heard in." J. Pirro, Criminal Law News (West-
chester County District Attorney Office, Sept. 1980). In Seattle, a superb police call referral
system enables the prosecutor to contact victims by letter in cases in which the police have not
made arrests, urging them to assist in a prosecution. To ask the victim to come forward and
discuss the possibility of prosecution creates a very different situation with regard to the vic-
tim's desires than one in which a victim has come forward of her own initiative. A copy of the
victim contact letter used by Seattle City Attorneys may be found in L. LERMAN, supra note
7, at 37. Finally, in Philadelphia, the issue of victim choice may be more theoretical than
actual. Prosecutor Bebe Kivitz reports that almost all the victims she sees want prosecutions
to proceed at the outset. Interview with Attorney Bebe Kivitz of the Domestic Abuse Unit of
the District Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Nov. 30, 1981).
Attorney Kivitz' observation concerning victim desires at the outset introduces the sec-
ond element of the issue of victim choice in the prosecution of spousal assault cases: the han-
dling of the "reluctant victim." What is important to note at this point is that victim
reluctance does not necessarily occur at the time that a filing decision must be made. Instead,
it is a phenomenon which is anticipated, and it is that anticipation which plays a role in the
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QUESTIONER: I didn't think so. If there were a robbery, for exam-
ple...
PROSECUTOR: I get your point.
QUESTIONER: . . . or a less serious, I use the word loosely, offense.
What about the victim of a petty theft?
PROSECUTOR: There we go. If the victim didn't care about a pros-
ecution, I probably wouldn't charge.82
QUESTIONER: That's a property crime. What about physical force?
PROSECUTOR: It makes some difference, yes.83  In general, I'm
more inclined to prosecute a crime involving physical force, even if the
victim isn't seeking a prosecution.
QUESTIONER: Yet in our hypothetical, you've made another
choice.84
PROSECUTOR: In our hypothetical the consequences for the victim
seem more momentous. There's more to lose than in other assault cases.
QUESTIONER: More to lose?
PROSECUTOR: Well, there's a relationship . . . oh.
QUESTIONER: I see we haven't dispensed with that idea.
PROSECUTOR: It's hard to let it go.85 But there's another reason
why I might decide not to prosecute because of the victim's motives. It
stems from the fact of the relationship, though it isn't because of my
concerns about harming a relationship.
QUESTIONER: What is that?
prosecutor's decision to charge. For further discussion of this problem, see infia notes 115-126,
and accompanying text.
82 "When the crime charged is a nonserious felony or misdemeanor, it is common. . . to
abide by the request of a reluctant victim." Hall, Role ofthe Victim, 28 VAND. L. REv. 931-951
(1975).
83 One commentator notes, "While the 'less serious crime' category is imprecise, prosecu-
tors generally exclude from this category crimes in which real or threatened physical force is
used." Id., at 931.
84 Hall found that "[iun domestic squabbles, however, even when force is used against one
spouse, the complainant's request to dismiss the charge frequently is honored. Id. (em-
phasis added).
85 A most dramatic, and tragic, example of our culture's reluctance to interfere, even
when force is used, in the face of a relationship or an assumed relationship between a man
and woman is the Kitty Genovese case. Fleming dedicated her book to Genovese and records
the fact that "[a]lthough thirty-nine people heard her screams and cries, no one called the
police. Most explained that they had thought the murderer was her husband." J. FLEMING,
supra note 1, at xi. Studies indicating norms approving violence in relationships are discussed
in Straus, supra note 1, at 550-51.
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PROSECUTOR: Well, relationships have emotional histories as well
as immediate emotional intensity. If I knew there were no serious physi-
cal injuries, and if I found the victim less than credible, I might become
suspicious about motive in a way that I would not with an assault upon
a stranger. 86
QUESTIONER: If the victim is less than credible, you may have a
problem with probable cause, not with motive.
PROSECUTOR: I used the wrong word. I'm skeptical about her mo-
tives, but I do believe that she was hit. For example, if the victim and
defendant had had an argument, a heated argument, and he hit her
once, and she wasn't really hurt...
QUESTIONER: Really hurt?
PROSECUTOR: . . .physically injured, but she's still furious. She
could be upset about something he'd said or done and not about being
hit. She could come here, file a complaint against him, and hope that
he gets prosecuted.87
QUESTIONER: You're talking about dealing with a vindictive
victim?
PROSECUTOR: Yes. I don't think the situation is too likely, but
QUESTIONER: But why does this situation worry you, likely or not?
PROSECUTOR: Because the victim is using the prosecution as a way
of getting back at the defendant and I don't think it's appropriate to
crank up the whole apparatus of the criminal law for that purpose.
QUESTIONER: Because?
PROSECUTOR: Because the system doesn't exist to right private
wrongs or fight private fights.88
QUESTIONER: I thought one of the theories underlying our system
of public prosecution was a preference for funnelling private vengeance
into socially acceptable forums.89 Crimes against persons are considered
86 The discussion which follows deals with the "possible improper motives" referred to
supra in note 73.
87 Miller notes that "[t]ypically, the victim of [a family] assault is initially insistent upon
prosecution of the offender." F. MILLER, supra note 11, at 266.
88 Fleming states: "The cardinal rule of the criminal-justice system is that it exists to pun-
ish criminals who threaten the peace and order of the state. It is concerned with redressing
public, rather than private wrongs. . . ." J. FLEMING, prua note 1, at 197 (emphasis in
original).
89 "[A]n inescapable and critical function of the criminal law is to satisfy and to channel
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public wrongs and are treated as such.
PROSECUTOR: That's true, but what I'm hypothesizing is a victim
who isn't feeling vengeful about the criminal act, but just about the
defendant in general or maybe about something else that he did. Let
me give you an analogy. Say you have a creditor who's angry that a
certain person hasn't paid up. One day the creditor and his debtor get
into an argument, the debtor shoves the creditor and the creditor then
decides to use the threat of prosecution as a means of forcing the man to
pay.go
QUESTIONER: You're saying that you don't want our victim to be
able to sue or threaten to use the criminal system to serve some other
end?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, exactly.
QUESTIONER: I'm not sure that your example is analogous. Your
creditor hopes to gain something that's extrinsic to the prosecution per
se, something in addition to revenge. He hopes to get his money.
PROSECUTOR: But our victim could use the threat of prosecution
in the same way.
QUESTIONER: How so?
PROSECUTOR: I'll elaborate. Say the victim and defendant had
been fighting because he'd been seeing another woman. The victim
hopes the prosecution will effectively end that other relationship.
QUESTIONER: And what does the victim stand to gain?
PROSECUTOR: She hopes to end the other relationship.
QUESTIONER: And live happily ever after with the defendant?
PROSECUTOR: I'm not going to fall into that trap. I know you'll
repeat what we've discussed about prosecution harming relationships.91
No, the goal is ruining the other relationship.
QUESTIONER: So she gains the pleasure of knowing she's prevented
the defendant from having his happiness?
PROSECUTOR: That's right.
the retributive feelings aroused by those who offend." Goldstein, Appendix to A. VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 174 (Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration 1976).
90 The ABA STANDARDS provide: "If prosecution is sought by a private party out of mal-
ice or to exert coercion on the defendant, as is sometimes the case in matters involving sexual
ojinses or debt collection, for example, the prosecutor may properly decline to prosecute." (em-
phasis added); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, standard 3-3.9(b)(iv) commentary at 3-56.
91 See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
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QUESTIONER: But that sounds like revenge rather than a separate
goal.
PROSECUTOR: I guess you could look at it that way.
QUESTIONER: And I don't imagine that you've disqualified this vic-
tim because of the fact that she was angry?
PROSECUTOR: No, of course not.
QUESTIONER: I ask because I'm troubled by what you said before
-that the victim was mad, but not about being hit.
PROSECUTOR: I think I can explain what I meant. If she isn't an-
gry about being hit, then the system isn't serving a retributive function
because of the crime. It's merely serving as a channel for all the angers
that can mount up over time in a relationship.
QUESTIONER: How would you even know so much about the focus
or source of this victim's anger?
PROSECUTOR: What if the victim told me?
QUESTIONER: I have trouble accepting that possibility, even for a
hypothetical. You've painted a picture of a scheming victim who wants
to use you to serve some other end. She's not likely to announce that she
doesn't really care about the very act for which she hopes you'll bring a
prosecution.
PROSECUTOR: Then say that a credible witness says "She told me
SO."
QUESTIONER: Even if I accept that possibility, it doesn't eliminate
my second worry about this case. Do you really believe that a person
could be so angry about so many things and not at all angry about
being hit? She might be less angry about that than about some other
things, but not at all angry?
IV. THE BLAME- PROSECUTOR: I agree it's hard to draw a
WORTHINESS line around emotions, but I'm still troubled by
OF THE As- the source of her feelings. Normally, motiva-
SAILANT AND tion wouldn't be as important in my decision,
VICTIM but if I prosecute this man, who may not be a
violent person, who was just upset by an argu-
ment, then his life may be harmed in a variety
of ways.
QUESTIONER: Yes, he'll be put through the ordeal of a prosecution.
If he's convicted he'll feel and be stigmatized.
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PROSECUTOR: Yes, and for one who hit in an upsetting situation!
QUESTIONER: So the concern then isn't the victim's motivation per
se, but the fact that prosecution seems disproportionate to the offense? 92
PROSECUTOR: Under the circumstances, it does seem
disproportionate.
QUESTIONER: Yet you said before that serious physical injury
would merit consideration for charging. Would it seem less dispropor-
tionate if he'd done more harm, if he'd knocked out teeth, badly injured
an eye, broken a bone?
PROSECUTOR: I think it might.
QUESTIONER: That sounds as if you're deciding that the victim
must suffer in a way and in an amount that you consider equivalent to
the suffering of being prosecuted before you're willing to charge.
PROSECUTOR: It doesn't sound good, but there's some truth in
that. It sounds less unpleasant if you think about the fact that you've
stripped away some of the import of serious injury. I said earlier that I
thought it was safe to assume that a more severe injury is indicative of a
more serious act. 93
QUESTIONER: Yes, and I wasn't sure if I agreed. In fact, I wasn't
sure what you meant.
PROSECUTOR: I think there may be a correlation in many cases
between the severity of an injury and the desire to harm.
QUESTIONER: So you infer greater culpability from the fact of
more severe injury and that inferred culpability justifies a prosecution?
PROSECUTOR: That's right.
QUESTIONER: Yet the severity may be nothing more than the de-
fendant's bad luck. The victim may have moved at the moment she was
hit and so he struck her at a different angle, for example.94
92 LaFave, supra note 13, at 534-35, lists "the most common situations in which prosecu-
tors typically decline to prosecute . . . (c) When the mere fact of prosecution would, in the
prosecutor's judgment, cause undue harm to the offender." Accord ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 11, Standard 3-3.9(b)(iii) ("the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to
the particular offense or the offender" is a factor to consider in the charging decision).
93 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
94 This point has been clearly made in M. STRAUS, R. GELLES & S. STEINMETZ, supra
note 48, in a discussion of their definition of "abusive violence" and its emphasis on act rather
than result:
[The things] which influence whether someone who is punched is injured or not, are
typically random phenomena such as aim or luck. The research on the difference be-
tween an assault and a homicide tends to bear out our position by arguing that a random
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PROSECUTOR: That, by the way, is one of the great problems with
these cases. It's very hard to prove intent.95
QUESTIONER: Isn't that true with stranger assault cases?96
PROSECUTOR: Well, I suppose. Maybe my resistance to charge is
based on my belief that in the situation we're discussing both parties are
probably equally to blame, yet a prosecution would only be directed at
the one who hit.97
QUESTIONER: They're equally to blame?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, they're fighting, he gets upset, strikes her, re-
grets it the next minute.
QUESTIONER: His regret makes a difference?
PROSECUTOR: It indicates that he isn't really a violent person.
QUESTIONER: No, it indicates that he's a person who used violence
and then regretted it.98
PROSECUTOR: But it's the sort of thing which could happen to any-
body and the idea of prosecuting all those cases...
QUESTIONER: The number of cases is a different issue. When you
say it could happen to anybody, is that another way of saying that you
still don't consider the act a crime?
PROSECUTOR: I guess it is. Everybody has relationships, gets in ar-
guments and gets upset. I'm not a violent person, but it's not inconceiv-
able that I might get pushed emotionally and lose control for one
minute and lash out and hit someone once.99 Do you really want me to
phenomenon such as aim often determines if a violent act ends up as a non-lethal assault
or as a homicide.
Id. at 21-22. This fact does call into question the element of culpability in the definition of
offenses against physical violence.
95 The problem of proving intent in spouse abuse cases was indirectly referred to by Man-
hattan District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthal during an interview in which he explained
why these cases are more often reduced to misdemeanors than are stranger assaults. See Pror
Links to Victim Cited in Reducing of Felonies, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at B6, col. 3.
96 District Attorney Morganthal did not clarify why proving intent was easier in stranger
assaults. Id.
97 The equally-to-blame vision of domestic violence is prevalent. See, e.g., F. MILLER,
supra note 11, at 267 ("Often the complainant is as 'guilty' as the suspect in contributing to
the dispute...").
98 In established patterns of violence in relationships, as opposed to the one violent out-
burst being hypothesized in the dialogue at this point, the assailant frequently feels "sorry
.... and conveys his contriteness." L. WALKER, supra note I, at 65.
99 According to a study by Gelles, our culture does permit a degree of what is called
"normal violence." See R. Gelles, cited in Straus, supra note 1, at 547. Straus remarks that
"[t]hese same attitudes are also widely shared by officials of the criminal justice system." Id.
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be prosecuting cases like that?
QUESTIONER: I really want to understand more of what you're say-
ing. When you said 'anyone' did you mean anyone with a relationship?
PROSECUTOR: Yes.
QUESTIONER: Because relationships generate emotion?
PROSECUTOR: That's right, and because intense emotion has the
potential of making a person lose control.100
QUESTIONER: Would you agree that anyone who is poor might
steal because poverty generates emotions and those emotions have the
potential of making people lose control?
PROSECUTOR: I'm not sure that it's the same quality of intensity,
but even if it is, the person who steals has time to consider the conse-
quences. The person in an argument doesn't.
QUESTIONER: How do you know that? The poor person may be
hungry, may walk by a crate of oranges, a loaf of fresh baked bread.
PROSECUTOR: Wouldn't you feel differently if the storekeeper had
seen the hungry person coming and had taunted him with the oranges
or the bread?
QUESTIONER: Tempted the thief?.
PROSECUTOR: Or provoked the spouse.
QUESTIONER: Was that what you meant when you said that prose-
cution seemed disproportionate to the crime because both were to
blame?
PROSECUTOR: You could put it that way, yes.
QUESTIONER: I ask because provocation has different connotations
and, as you know, different consequences. 10
PROSECUTOR: I understand.
QUESTIONER: Yet you speak of a situation in which prosecution is
not justified rather than one in which a prosecution should occur but in
which there are mitigating elements.
ao0 A study by Straus demonstrated that loss of control is itself governed by norms of the
degree of loss of control which is permissible. Straus, supra note 1, at 547. It does not take
more than ordinary observation to note that a man who hits his wife may "choose" not to hit
others, for example employers, who have upset him to an equal degree.
101 "[I]t is settled that, in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, provocation merely
by abusive language does not, in itself, justify the commission of an assault or assault and
battery." 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault & Battery § 61 (1963).
[Vol. 75
SPOUSAL ASSAULT
PROSECUTOR: I think that in a relationship, because of the emo-
tional vulnerability, provocation may rise to the level of a
justification. 1 0 2
QUESTIONER: Yet only one person has been accused of hitting.
PROSECUTOR: The other has hit with words.
QUESTIONER: And you will therefore ignore the battery? 0 3
PROSECUTOR: You keep making it sound black and white. Look,
I'll agree that if there's been no provocation, I should consider charging
here-even in the absence of serious injury. I'm making a big conces-
sion, but I'm not willing to go farther. In fact, I think it's your turn to
answer some questions.
QUESTIONER: Okay.
PROSECUTOR: I want to hear what you'd do with our example if
there were provocation. I want to hear you, if it were you and not I who
had to decide, say that you would choose to go ahead and initiate a
prosecution.
QUESTIONER: The same details that we've been discussing?
PROSECUTOR: That's right. A victim comes in, reports being hit,
and you find out that there's been an argument. She's upset about a lot
of things, not just being hit, maybe not even about being hit, he's never
hit her before, she admits having baited him, she has no visible physical
injuries, and she says he's repentant...
QUESTIONER: And you want to know if I'd charge?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, and you can assume that the victim is more
than willing to testify, that you have no problems of proof.
QUESTIONER: I'm not the one who's worried about proof.
PROSECUTOR: Well you may be soon if you have to imagine being
a prosecutor. What would you do?
QUESTIONER: I'd ask many questions.
102 This attitude is common. For example, Miller refers to the fact that in Detroit, where
detectives work in the prosecutor's office and make charging decisions in these cases for the
prosecutor, a decision not to file charges "normally is the result when a husband has assaulted
his wife but the injury is not serious and it appears that there was 'good cause' for him to do
so." F. MILLER, supra note 1I, at 269 n.22, quoted in L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 17.
103 Compare the common equation of provocation and justification used by prosecutors, see
supra note 102, with the provision of the Tennessee Code which makes "assault and battery
upon a spouse 'for any cause whatsoever' a misdemeanor." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-602, cited
in A. BOYLAN & N. TAUB, supra note 8, at 180.
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PROSECUTOR: I told you what happened.
QUESTIONER: You didn't tell me what the provocation consisted
of.
PROSECUTOR: I said words, but it's not an issue. There's no dis-
pute about whether there was provocation. 10 4
QUESTIONER: Beauty's in the eye of the beholder. I'd ask about
the nature of the provocation.
PROSECUTOR: Okay, say it's no more than vicious words.
QUESTIONER: It's not having served the wrong vegetable with
dinner? 105
PROSECUTOR: Don't be ridiculous.
QUESTIONER: And I'd ask about this hit that's being reported.
PROSECUTOR: A smack on the cheek.
QUESTIONER: Once? 10 6
PROSECUTOR: Just once, yes, and just with his hand. 10 7
QUESTIONER: Hands aren't always so innocuous. And you said no
history of hitting?' 0
PROSECUTOR: That might indicate a pattern? No history.
QUESTIONER: With her?' 0 9
PROSECUTOR: The victim couldn't answer that.
104 Victims of spousal assaults frequently blame themselves for provoking or otherwise
causing the violence, a fact which may be attributable at least in part to the fact that we live
in a culture in which "the belief that it is rational to blame the victim" is common. L.
WALKER, Supra note 1, at 15.
105 One commentator found that "[t]he most frequent reasons given by battered women
for beatings concern such things as the dinner not being cooked on time or the house being
dirty." J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 78.
106 "Police and prosecutors frequently assume these attacks are 'one-punch' fights, but
when the twenty victims of Eisenberg and Micklow's study were hit, it was invariably more
than once. Usually they receive a beating that lasted anywhere from five to ten minutes to
over an hour." D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 112.
107 One study reported that "[hiusbands inflicted injuries on their wives with their hands
in nearly half the cases [of aggravated assault], followed in frequency by blunt instruments,
sharp instruments, and firearms." L. BOWKER, WOMEN, CRIME, AND THE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM 125 (1978) (information from a 17-city study done by the National Comm'n on
the Causes of Prevention of Violence).
108 See supra note 49.
109 Findings of a recent study of patterns of violence indicated that 32% of domestic assault
defendants had been rearrested for other crimes mostly unrelated to the original victim. See A
Study of Patterns in Family Violence, supra note 49.
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QUESTIONER: The assailant might be able to. But let's say no his-
tory, one hit, vicious verbal provocation, no injuries. I might warn,
then, rather than charging.
PROSECUTOR: Warn?
QUESTIONER: Yes, I might inform the assailant in no uncertain
terms that battery is a crime, that I am letting it go this time, but will
not the next time whether there's provocation or not. And I'd keep a
record of the complaint.l1o
PROSECUTOR: So you're willing to make an exception to your ar-
gument favoring charging in every case with probable cause?
QUESTIONER: I might be willing.
PROSECUTOR: And what's your "might" about?
QUESTIONER: It's a recognition of the fact that real life always has
more detail than hypotheticals. And it's also a concession that there
may be some cases this extreme which would force me to fall back on
my intuition in deciding whether to charge. .... "I
PROSECUTOR: I'm delighted to accept one concession.
QUESTIONER: . . . though I always feel safer when I can articulate
the basis of a hunch. I think I may be saying "might" because you said
that the victim came in.
PROSECUTOR: I did say that. What difference would that make?
QUESTIONER: It makes me wonder whether the police were called.
Perhaps they arrived, felt they didn't have grounds for an arrest, 112 told
the victim to go and file a citizen's complaint.
PROSECUTOR: Okay, say the police were called. So what?
QUESTIONER: Then I might wonder whether the victim had been
frightened by being hit. Fear's an injury, you know. It narrows people's
lives.
PROSECUTOR: But before you mentioned terrible fear. Now you're
worried about ordinary fear?
110 The Westchester District Attorney's Office sends out approximately 200 warning letters
each year. The letter states that no charges are being filed, but the complaint will be kept on
file. A copy of the letter may be found in L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 67. The letters have
been found not to precipitate violence. They also appear to have served some deterrent func-
tion: "subsequent violence appears to be rare." Id. at 64.
111 "The frailties of human language and human perception will always admit of border-
line cases. . . ." Goldstein, supra note 9, at 586.
112 See supra note 30.
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QUESTIONER: If a person is made afraid of another person, all it
takes is a threat to harm in order to maintain that fear. 1 3 It's an injury
that I consider serious, and so I might charge.
PROSECUTOR: Then assume there's no fear in this situation.
QUESTIONER: All right. I'll make a deal with you.
PROSECUTOR: Okay.
QUESTIONER: If you can find me this collection of facts in reality,
then I'll agree to warn instead of charging.
PROSECUTOR: I agree it's unlikely.
QUESTIONER: Particularly in light of the police screening which
you said takes place. 1
14
PROSECUTOR: That's true.
QUESTIONER: Could we move back to the sorts of realities among
which you are apt to be choosing when you have to consider whether or
not to charge?
V. IMAGES OF PROSECUTOR: Yes, and I have some real-
THE VICTIM: ities which are still bothering me. A while ago
RELUCTANCE I mentioned the victim who's going to drop
TO PROSECUTE out after I've charged the defendant with an
offense.
QUESTIONER: Yes, I remember. Didn't we decide that your con-
cern had to do with your need to win a conviction?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, but only in part. I'm still not satisfied by your
assumption that I shouldn't pay more attention to the victim's feelings
in deciding whether to charge.
QUESTIONER: I didn't say that, but why do you think you should
pay more attention to the victim's desires?
PROSECUTOR: Well, I'm concerned because I think a prosecution
may add to her stress and fear and for no purpose since she's apt to drop
out anyway.
113 Walker found that "[t]here does not need to be a steady reign of terror for the family
atmosphere to be emotionally charged. Rather, the stage needs to be set through prior inci-
dents . . . the only variable is when it [the next assault] might occur." L. WALKER, supra
note 1, at 148. The presence of fear is related to the fact that "violence is often used as a
mechanism to control the behavior of family members." M. STRAUS, R. GELLES & S. STEIN-
MET'E, supra note 49, at 190.
114 For further discussion of police screening, seesupra notes 6 & 29. Victims perform a sort
of self-screening as well. See supra note 49.
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QUESTIONER: So you're concerned about putting the victim
through more hardship as well as about your need for conviction.
PROSECUTOR: Yes.
QUESTIONER: I want to backtrack a minute. How do you know
that the victim is going to drop out?
PROSECUTOR: Anyone who's worked with this type of offense
knows that these victims will probably refuse to testify.' 5
QUESTIONER: How? Do they refuse outright?
PROSECUTOR: No. They might be angry, ambivalent, reluctant.
QUESTIONER: And when you see anger, ambivalence, reluctance
PROSECUTOR: I assume refusal, that's right. 16
QUESTIONER: You're a step ahead of me.
PROSECUTOR: It's becoming easier to predict your remarks.
1 15 Victim reluctance is the most common reason for nonprosecution of cases of spousal
assault. For example, L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 13, states: "From the prosecutor's perspec-
tive, the primary problem with prosecution of spouse abuse is that it is time wasted, since
most victims request that charges be dropped before dispositions are reached."
A prosecutor who has not been personally exposed to the legendary "reluctant victim"
will learn of her soon enough through official literature available to prosecutors. So, for ex-
ample, in elucidating ABA Standard 3-3.9(b)(v) "reluctance of the victim to testify," the
Commentary states that
In serious cases . . . the interests of the community require that the prosecutor try to
obtain the victim's co-operation. . . . In contrast, the prosecutor may justifiably decline
to prosecute less serious offenses because of lack of witness co-operation. This discretion is
commonly exercised in family conflicts where minor violence occurs. Often the injured
party who calls the police is later reluctant about prosecution ...
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11 at 3-57. The California District Attorney's Association has
adopted the same view: "If the prosecutor believes that the victim's testimony will not be
forthcoming, an assault is ordinarily not subject to successful prosecution and should, there-
fore, not be filed ....... CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S Ass'N, UNIFORM CRIME
CHARGING MANUAL 3044 (4th ed. 1978 Revisions). The prosecutor is expected to consider
interviewing the victim of an assault "[w]henever there is a pre-existing relationship between
an accused and a victim." Id.
That this sort of commentary may both be based upon and contribute to stereotypic
biases can be demonstrated by a careful reading of the following passage by Miller: "Officials
commonly believe that [married female] victims of assaults . . . will not willingly prosecute
their assailants. . . . When the victim is a [wife] and is unwilling to sign a complaint, the
reluctance of the victim is usually accepted by police and prosecutors." F. MILLER, supra note
11, at 174-75. What is notable about this excerpt is that the words in brackets have been
substituted in both cases for the word "Negro" which is found in the original text.
116 The existence or absence of assumptions about the victim is crucial in the successful or
unsuccessful prosecution of the cases. See supra note 74 and infra note 123.
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QUESTIONER: Well tell me what basis you have for your
assumption.
PROSECUTOR: What characteristically happens is that if you
charge the defendant and get a hearing date, the victim either doesn't
show at all or she calls up saying that she's reconciled or doesn't want to
testify for some other reason.1 t 7
QUESTIONER: And when these victims call up, what do you say to
them?
PROSECUTOR: There's nothing to say. I say okay and I dismiss the
case, if I've made the mistake of charging in the first place ...
QUESTIONER: And when you're speaking to a victim at the first in-
terview, how do you handle the fact of her reluctance and its assumed
result? 118
PROSECUTOR: I don't actively discourage them from prosecuting,
the way some prosecutors do. 1 9 But I spell out the difficulties so that
they -know what they're letting themselves in for. They often decide
right then and there that it's not worth it to them.
QUESTIONER: And if you're not so lucky?
117 Assumed victim concerns, such as the desire to reconcile or worries about financial
repercussions should a husband be jailed, have been seen as insurmountable obstacles to pros-
ecution. As to the latter concern, the danger of sanctions affecting the victim and (possibly)
her children, Attorney Sally Buckley has devised a solution. She grants victims the right to
participate in the sentence recommendation so that a punishment can be given in the case of
a conviction, but not one which is fearful for or damaging to the victim or her dependants.
See L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 37 ("Victim Contact Letter"). But see, ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 11, 3-3.9 Commentary at 3-57, where refusal to prosecute is found to be justifiable
on the basis that the victim's reluctance stems in part from "the harmful consequences of
prosecution to the family."
The second perceived source of victim reluctance is the reconciliation concept, or, as the
ABA expresses it, "because the dispute has been resolved." Id. As LaFave has written, "The
assumption apparently is that uncoerced forgiveness reflects a lack of importance attached to
the incident by the victim (and, perhaps by the aggressor), so that non-prosecution is not
contrary to the statutory policy of discouraging the settlement of disputes by force." LaFave,
supra note 13, at 534. Although it is not unimaginable that a reconciliation has taken place
(or will take place), there is much reason to believe that the victim's change of heart after
charges have been filed is due less to love and more to the possibility "that the woman is
pressured. . . . The husband either apologizes and promises . . . reminds her that he sup-
ports her financially, or threatens to abuse her still further if she proceeds." Woods, supra note
7, at 10. For innovative responses to victim withdrawal problems, see infda note 125 and
accompanying text.
118 The first interview of a victim of spousal assault (of whatever degree or kind) is the
most difficult task of the prosecutor. See, e.g., Filing Guidelines, King County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office, reprinted in L. LERMAN, supra note 7, Appendix E at 176-77.
119 See, e.g., F. MILLER, supra note 11, at 266 ("For several reasons, prosecutors attempt to
dissuade prosecution in these cases and are usually successful in that attempt.").
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PROSECUTOR: And if you're not so sarcastic, I may answer you.
QUESTIONER: I'm sorry. Go on.
PROSECUTOR: I may ask them to think it over and let me know
later what they want to do. A cooling off period is usually enough for
them to realize that they're not willing to go through with a
prosecution. 120
QUESTIONER: So you don't actively discourage?12 1
PROSECUTOR: No, no. Their needs are respected and I don't have
to waste my limited time.
QUESTIONER: And you don't actively encourage? 22
PROSECUTOR: Why should I encourage victims who are going to
drop out anyway?
QUESTIONER: Because victims, if encouraged, might not drop out.
PROSECUTOR: You're implying that I'm creating a self-fulfilling
prophecy?
QUESTIONER: Yes, and there are studies now showing that prosecu-
tors do just that.12 3
120 See, id. at 266-67, where the author notes: "Prosecutors are aware that, in many such
cases [spousal assaults], the complainant will desire not to prosecute after sufficient time has
passed for tempers to cool and second thoughts to be given to the seriousness of this course of
action."
121 The active discouragement of victims is now illegal in New York State, according to the
most recent summary of state legislation. See Center for Women Policy Studies, Response to
Violence in the Family, State Legislation on Domestic Violence Chart, Washington, D.C.
(Sept.-Oct. 1981). This law is the result not only of a history of discouragement by law en-
forcement officials in Family and Criminal Court, see Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396
N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), afd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979)(litigation
directed at the problem of official discouragement), but also of the fact that victims in New
York have a choice between criminal and civil remedies. This choice and its detrimental
effect on victims is analyzed in Note,Jurisdiction over Family Ofenses in New York: A Reconsidera-
tion of the Provisions for Choice of Forum, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 601 (1980).
122 Goldstein points out the difference between not discouraging and actively encouraging
on the part of the police in the handling of assault cases. See Goldstein, supra note 9, at 576.
Prosecutorial refusal to charge in these cases on the ground that "victim refuses to prosecute"
was a stated reason for the police reticence in encouraging victims to sign complaints. Id. at
575 n. 67.
123 See, e.g., F. CANNAVALE, JR. & W. FALCON, IMPROVING WITNESS COOPERATION 11:50,
11:39 (1976), quoted in K. WILLIAMS, THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM IN THE PROSECUTION OF
VIOLENT CRIMES 31 (1978), which concludes:
The assumption was occasionally made that witnesses would not persevere in the prose-
cution of a friend or relative no matter how cooperative the witness initially seemed to
be. . . . Inadequate communications between police/prosecutor and witness was a sig-
nificant cause of prosecutors' labeling many witnesses as noncooperators .. .not only
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PROSECUTOR: And if they call up later because my prophecy has
been fulfilled for other reasons?
QUESTIONER: If they call up saying they don't want to testify?12 4
PROSECUTOR: That's what happens.
QUESTIONER: Then you must devise a system to respond to their
fears and answer their questions. 125 You may discover more cooperation
than you've imagined possible.' 2 6
PROSECUTOR: And if I do all that you're suggesting and they still
won't cooperate?
QUESTIONER: No conviction.' 2 7
PROSECUTOR: Look, you can go on until you're blue in the face
about the way in which my thinking is distorted by an emphasis on the
because communications difficulties tended to discourage or 'turn off' some witnesses...
but also because the system, by casting a false shadow of noncooperation on many wit-
nesses, led theprosecutor to misinterpret their true intentions.
Lerman is in accord with this assessment:
The recent experience of family violence prosecutors reveals no correlation between any
identifiable characteristics of the cases or the victims and the likelihood of cooperation.
The probability of victim cooperation is in fact better predicted by the conduct of the prose-
cutor than by the conduct of either the victim or the defendant.
L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 41 (emphasis added).
124 Victims do call up and say they wish to withdraw after charges have been filed. Sally
Buckley of the Seattle District Attorney's Office reports that 50% of the victims contact her
about wanting not to testify. Interview with Sally Buckley, Seattle District Attorney's Office
(Nov. 30, 1981).
125 Experimental programs have devised systems which do respond to victims' fears and
questions. Buckley, for example, reports that victims frequently express fear of going to court
or guilt about assisting in the prosecution. Her office sees one of its major tasks as providing
victims with information about the court and the prosecutorial system and with emotional
support. Id.
Support systems are coupled with "no drop" policies: victims are informed that once
charges are filed, the prosecutor will proceed with the case even if the victim develops a
reluctance. A major advantage of this policy is that the victim cannot be coerced into not
testifying or enticed into "repeatedly testing [her] resolve to go to court." L. LERMAN, supra
note 7, at 44-47. For an example of an abuse of a "no drop" policy, see infra note 127.
126 These programs have had impressive results in reducing victim-witness attrition in
cases of spousal assault. For a summary of the percentage of cases in which victims cooper-
ated, see L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 34-35. For example, in 1979, the Santa Barbara cooper-
ation rate was 92% of the cases in which charges were filed. Sally Buckley reports that her
victim attrition rate is no different in spousal assault cases than in other crimes. Interview
with Sally Buckley, Seattle District Attorney's Office (Nov. 30, 1981).
127 A recent case in Alaska demonstrated an extreme which advocates of a "no drop" pol-
icy found inflexible and unfortunate. The victim-wife was jailed for a day because she de-
cided not to testify. See Spouse-Abuse Victim Jailed After No-Drop Poliy Invoked, The National
Law Journal, Aug. 22, 1983, at 4, col. 3. One advocate called the tactic "outrageous." Id.
(quoting Lisa Lerman).
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need for conviction. But you aren't the one who has to deal with de-
fense attorneys or walk into a courtroom and try these cases.
QUESTIONER: No, I'm not. Nor do I have to bear the consequences
of a decision to charge. But I'm not willing to let you fall back on that
felt need to convict as long as I sense that that criterion provides a
screening function which relieves you of the responsibilities of examin-
ing your own assumptions or devising more effective ways of dealing
with this type of case.
PROSECUTOR: I have only so much time and money and I have
more cases now than you can imagine. If I can charge in some kinds of
cases knowing that I'll get convictions and that I'll be able to put people
away, to protect the public, then why should I put out effort in other
cases and come up with nothing? Particularly when coming up with
nothing may convey the idea that people can get away with these
assaults?
QUESTIONER: You're saying so many things at once...
PROSECUTOR: They're all factors. I can't put one or more aside.
VI. LIKELIHOOD QUESTIONER: I'd rather look at one thing
OF CONVIC- at a time. I guess you're going to get your
TION chance to explain to me the significance of the
likelihood of conviction in your decision
whether to charge.
PROSECUTOR: I feel as if you're making me belabor the obvious.
QUESTIONER: Try to be optimistic. I know that I've always en-
joyed learning more about the obvious.
PROSECUTOR: Are you familiar with the notion of deterrence? 128
QUESTIONER: I am.
PROSECUTOR: Then perhaps you'll explain to me how anyone is
128 One commentator explains deterrence as follows:
Deterrence is viewed as working in two principal fashions. One involves the effect of
imposing criminal sanctions on the subsequent behavior of the individual actually pun-
ished. This deterent effect .. . has come to be known as "special deterrence". . . . The
second type of deterrence is concerned with the symbolic effect that punishment may
have on potential criminals. The imposition of sanctions on one person may demon-
strate to the rest of the public the expected costs of a criminal act, and thereby discour-
age criminal behavior in the general population. This deterrent effect has come to be
known as 'general deterrence.'
Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITA-
TION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 95 (1978).
1984]
JANE W ELLIS
going to be deterred from these assaults if there's never a conviction in
these cases.
QUESTIONER: Do you know for a fact that charging itself has no
deterrent value or that charging without conviction is worse than
nothing?
PROSECUTOR: Not for a fact, no.
QUESTIONER: I'd be surprised if you did. My impression is that
there is much controversy surrounding the empirical findings about
deterrence.1
29
PROSECUTOR: Deterrence is a theory .. .
QUESTIONER: There are studies.
PROSECUTOR: If you want to speak empirically you can, but ...
QUESTIONER: I want to examine the basis of an assumption . ..
PROSECUTOR: I'm more concerned about common sense.
QUESTIONER: And common sense tells you what?
PROSECUTOR: That people are deterred- by the possibility of a
conviction.
QUESTIONER: My common sense tells me something different. I
don't find it farfetched to imagine that some people might be deterred
by the idea of conviction, but others stopped cold by the prospect of
being arrested and/or charged whether or not they imagine being
convicted. 13
0
PROSECUTOR: Come on. Imagine a guy in a bar saying to his
friend, "Guess what. I hit my wife the other night, just a little fight, and
she called the cops and the damn cop arrested me and the D.A. actually
129 See, e.g., Bynum, Forst, Rhodes & Shirhall, Sentencing and Social Research: A Review of the
Literature on Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Rehabilitation, in EXECUTIVE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON SENTENCING, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN NEW YORK Appendix at 251 (Report to Gov-
ernor Carey, 1979). This comprehensive discussion of philosophical and empirical aspects of
deterrence is concerned with the phenomenon in relation to the formal sanction of sentencing
rather than in relation to charging per se and any perceived punitive effect which charging
might have.
130 One commentator notes that "[slometimes as little as a warning from a judge, an order
of protection or an arrest causes men to cease their violent conduct." Woods, supra note 7, at
12. A recent study by the Police Foundation confirms "that the beet way for the police to
prevent repeated acts of violence in the home may be simply to arrest men suspected of
assaulting their wives or lovers. . [o]nly 10 percent of those arrested generated a new official
report . . . within six months" compared with 16% of those who received mediation instead
of arrest and 22% of those who were simply ordered to leave their homes temporarily. Domes-
tic Violence: Study Favors Arrest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1983, at C1 & C4, cols. 1 & 3.
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charged me with assault. But my lawyer says it's all a joke, because they
won't get a conviction." Do you really think his friend, who may have
hit his own wife, is going to be deterred by hearing that?
QUESTIONER: It depends on who the friend is, what the friend feels
he may stand to lose. These cases aren't limited to the destitute.
13
'
PROSECUTOR: I suppose some people might be deterred. It's possi-
ble. But the public cares about convictions whether or not they have
statistical data on deterrence. It reassures them. It reassures me. Why
would anyone feel able to rely on a system that can't convict people who
are charged?
QUESTIONER: What is there to rely on other than the idea of deter-
rence which may or may not be operating and certainly not in ways that
we can easily predict?
PROSECUTOR: People can rely on convictions because they mean
that someone is taken off the streets.
QUESTIONER: The public is reassured because conviction permits
incarceration and so the criminal is incapacitated?
PROSECUTOR: That's right.
QUESTIONER: But if we're speaking of minor offenses here, there is
little chance of incarceration or little chance of anything more than a
very short jail term. 32
PROSECUTOR: Maybe so, but it's what the public buys. 133
QUESTIONER: You don't have to sell. You can consider educating
the public about the nature of these offenses and the importance of initi-
131 "It is well established that spouse abuse occurs in epidemic proportions in the United
States, and that it pervades every race and ethnic group, every economic class, every area of
the country." Center for Women Policy Studies, supra note 8, at I. One author found that
"[people who work with spouse abuse cases] say that first offenders who have had no prior
experience with the criminal justice system are deterred by the threat of prosecution.
Fromson, supra note 33, at 3.
Sally Buckley of the Seattle District Attorney's Office reports that it is her subjective
impression that a number of defendants are upset most of all by the "hassles with the law"
rather than by conviction per se. Interview with Sally Buckley, Seattle District Attorney's
Office (Nov. 30, 1981).
132 Sentences are generally minimal: "If an assailant is found guilty, the usual penalty is
probation and/or a fine. . . . If the assault is particularly severe or if it's his second or third
conviction, he may spend some time in jail and receive a suspended sentence." J. FLEMING,
supra note 1, at 45.
133 The influence of public opinion on prosecutorial decisions is a complex issue which will
not be discussed in this dialogue. For a brief discussion of this question, specifically in rela-
tion to election versus appointment of prosecutors, see the commentary to ABA Standard 3-
2.3 and references cited therein, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 3-2 1.
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ating prosecutions in an effort to make the State's position
unambiguous.
PROSECUTOR: Even assuming that the public might be receptive,
I'd still have big problems within the system. What member of the de-
fense bar, for example, is going to negotiate seriously with a D.A. who's
never won a case for a given offense? And which of my fellow D.A.'s
isn't going to get suspicious about the quality of my work if I keep filling
up the docket and then coming up with nothing but dismissals or
acquittals? 1 34
QUESTIONER: You keep using phrases like "coming up with noth-
ing but" or "never won." Your thinking about convictions obscures the
possibility of changing your handling of these cases, which is one of the
reasons, by the way, that I began by asking you to charge on the basis of
probable cause.
PROSECUTOR: What are you suggesting?
QUESTIONER: That you stop equating infrequent conviction with
no conviction and using that equation as justification for not attempting
to learn more about solving the problems of proof.135 You might begin
by substituting the word "seldom" for "never" and see that if over time
you can't succeed in changing "seldom" to "sometimes ... "
PROSECUTOR: "Seldom" isn't going to take me a long ways with a
defense attorney.
QUESTIONER: "Seldom" won't get you any leverage? 36
PROSECUTOR: Depends on the attorney and the attorney's experi-
ence. If he knows as much as I do about this type of victim . . .
134 One commentator, writing about the prosecutor's better bargaining position if he "con-
sistently succeeds in court," noted that "the effect of this pressure to avoid [possibly unsuccess-
ful litigaton] may be that the court calendar remains uncluttered. . . . But it seems
unreasonable that the trial process should be reserved only for cases in which conviction is
assured. ... Cox, supra note 11, at 414-15; see also id. at 414 (reference to the prosecutor's
"status within the office [being] based upon conviction rate").
135 Cox noted that "[c]onversion of the prosecutor's desire to win into a resolution never to
lose means that he avoids prosecution of doubtful or difficult cases." Id.
136 Leverage in plea bargaining is frequently acquired by prosecutorial bluffing, a phe-
nomenon described in Ostrow, The Case for Preplea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581, 1585-87
(1981). This tactic is often used when the prosecutor has insufficient evidence to prove an
accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, in cases other than spousal assaults,
prosecutors are known to file charges in which "the evidence is not likely to support the
burden of proof." Id. at 1585 n.15.
This writer does not advocate the practice of bluffing, but refers to it in order to demon-
strate that if prosecutors are able and willing to proceed in other cases with "so little evi-
dence," they should be prepared to negotiate with a defense attorney when there is more than
a little evidence, but some worries about assumed victim withdrawal.
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QUESTIONER: This type of victim? I think you must work to dispel
your stereotype.
PROSECUTOR: It's not just a stereotype; there's the experience of
many prosecutors.
QUESTIONER: Many prosecutors have not had the inclination or
the opportunity to learn more. I'll tell you now that although I believe
what I've been saying about the importance of chargingper se, I've been
pulling your leg a bit. I wanted to hear your thinking about likelihood
of conviction, so I waited until now to tell you that you may have a
much greater likelihood of conviction if you adopt some of the programs
that have been devised by those few prosecutors who have now worked
extensively with these cases.' 3 7 I hope you'll forgive me.
VII. LIMITED RE- PROSECUTOR: I'll forgive you more
SOURCES quickly if you can tell me where these people
get the time and the money to handle these
cases.' 38 I'm quite concerned that an inordi-
nate amount of resources would be expended
in attempting to control infractions of a rela-
tively minor nature.' 39
QUESTIONER: You want me to respond to the question of resources,
but the word that's leaping out at me is "minor."
PROSECUTOR: I only meant minor in terms of physical injury. I'm
not trying to diminish the significance of these assaults to victims. I'd be
willing to expend some amount of time and energy, but . . .
QUESTIONER: If some is what you have, then I'm sure you'll make
the best use of it that you can.' 40 And if you have none, I can only ask
137 Lerman found that "[d]omestic violence prosecution units have not only reduced case
attrition, but have also obtained a high rate of convictions. Notably, the Seattle program
reports that 83 percent of the domestic violence cases which go to court result in convictions."
L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 35.
138 The experimental programs were originally funded with the help of LEAA grants for a
Family Violence Program. The Seattle program is now permanently funded by the City of
Seattle. Interview with Sally Buckley, Seattle District Attorney's Office (Nov. 30, 1981). The
Philadelphia program receives state and municipal funds. Interview with Bebe Kivitz of the
Domestic Abuse Unit of the District Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Nov. 30,
1981).
139 This statement, beginning with the word "an" is taken verbatim from F. MILLER, supra
note 11, at 267.
140 For a discussion of the difference between the importance of prosecuting this type of
offense and an insistence that every single case be prosecuted, see supra note 50.
Prosecutors in the experimental programs feel that even with the increased caseload
which may result from public recognition that the criminal justice system is now willing to
prosecute these cases, there will be "fewer wasted resources." L. LERMAN, supra note 7, at 44.
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you to make some.
PROSECUTOR: I'm still bothered by something, though. I don't feel
good about choosing to put effort into this type of case because I think
there's a good chance that violence in relationships is inevitable so
that14'...
QUESTIONER: I agree that prosecution by itself is probably not go-
ing to wipe family violence out of the society, particularly when such
violence is perceived as inevitable. But prosecution is your job and it's
the contribution that you can make. Other people will have their
contributions. 142
PROSECUTOR: But I think we could use up resources until the end
of time and not even lessen this problem.
QUESTIONER: Do you know that for a fact?
PROSECUTOR: No, of course not.
QUESTIONER: Yet you have reason for believing it.
PROSECUTOR: I have a belief that the only lasting solution is for
people to learn new ways of relating. In fact, I think that if victims
would refuse to be assaulted, if they would simply get out of these rela-
tionships, then the problem would be solved. 4 3
QUESTIONER: You assume they can leave?
PROSECUTOR: We're talking about adults. Why shouldn't they
leave?
This optimistic evaluation is, of course, premised on a belief that some prosecution of these
cases is worthwhile. A prosecutor who is opposed to taking on any of these cases would prefer
no resources to less waste.
141 F. MILLER, supra note 11, at 267.
142 Other people have been contributing for some time, as the many references in these
footnotes indicate. One of the more recent areas in which work has begun is concerned with
working with violent (including "minor" violence) men in counseling and consciousness-rais-
ing groups. One such group in which men have taken the initiative to work with men is
"Emerge" in Somerville, Massachusetts. The work that must be done may reach much fur-
ther than the changes which focus on the problem of spousal assaults itself. For example,
violence in media is a broader area that may play a role in the continued cultural patterns
generating the enormous amount of family violence in our society.
143 This attitude is widely held: "[T]he prevailing attitude of many prosecutors and judges
is that family violence is a private matter and should be worked out. . . without the inter-
vention of the court." M. STRAUS, R. GELLES & S. STEINMETZ, supra note 49, at 233. Many
also believe that "if only the victim would leave" there would be no need to prosecute, which
is simply another version of family violence as a private problem. For many years, prosecu-
tors would not file charges unless the woman indicated that she would leave-by getting a
divorce. See Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 7, at 158. This "divorce test" reflects both the




QUESTIONER: Many, many reasons. 144 They may be economically
dependent, they may have responsibility for young children and no
place to take those children, they may know ofno place where they can
retreat and the person who's harmed them will not pursue them, they
may fear retaliation for an attempt to leave. And you assume that they
never do try to leave, but we now know that some number do make that
attempt and are then forced back, by hardship, into the homes in which
they've been assaulted. 145
PROSECUTOR: I spoke hastily, and I apologize. Still, even granting
that there are constraints, I think it's unlikely that anything will change
until victims stand up for their right not to be hit.
QUESTIONER: Until they stand up and declare that it's behavior
which they will not tolerate?
PROSECUTOR: Exactly.
QUESTIONER: When the society in which they live does tolerate
that behavior and communicates that tolerance by refusing to condemn
these assaults as criminal?
PROSECUTOR: Do you really believe that if I began to charge more
in these cases that the victims of such assaults would change?
QUESTIONER: I do believe that, 146 but I don't think it's the business
or the function of the criminal justice system to change victims. I think
your task is a simpler one. You can use the resources, or some part of
the resources at your command to make an unequivocal statement
against the use of force or the threat of force in relationships. And if
144 Other reasons for victims not leaving, in addition to those listed in the dialogue, are
guilt, emotional dependence, low self-esteem, traditional value systems, isolation, ambiva-
lence, embarrassment and shame, fear of insanity, physical illness, learned helplessness-a
theory attributed to the work of L. Walker. See L. Walker, supra note 1, at 31-35 and 42-54.
These factors are each discussed in J. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 81-95. A great deal of re-
search has been done in this area. See, e.g., Gelles, Abused Wives, Why Do Thy Slay?, J. MAR-
RIAGE & FAM. 659 (1976).
145 According to Professor Maria Marcus of Fordham Law School, research done by Pro-
fessor Murray Straus of the University of New Hampshire Sociology Department indicates
that up to 90% of the women do make an attempt to leave home and end up returning
because they cannot survive alone financially. Interview with Maria Marcus (Feb. 10, 1982)
(discussing her participation in a New York City Bar Association panel discussion on spouse
abuse, held Feb. 8, 1982). In short, there is now reason to believe that although women must
contend with the various factors listed in the dialogue and in note 144, supra, they are also
able to overcome these factors in many cases, at least to the point of making an attempt to
leave. More research is necessary in order to describe when and under what circumstances
these women leave and return.
146 Attorney Sally Buckley reports that she has received accounts from victims that the fact
of prosecution did enable them to gain confidence and assert their right not to be hit. Inter-
view with Sally Buckley, Seattle District Attorney's Office (Nov. 30, 1981).
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you'd agree with me that that is a worthwhile task, then we could begin
to work on some of the practical challenges of prosecuting these
offenses. 147
PROSECUTOR: Assuming that I do decide that I agree, do you
think it would be appropriate to devise diversion programs or less for-
mal forums for the less serious cases?' 48
QUESTIONER: I'll tell you the first question I'd ask myself if I were
trying to make a decision about that issue. I'd wonder whether my in-
terest in such alternatives reflected some special requirement of these
cases or whether instead it served merely to shift the ambivalence, our
culture's ambivalence, about treating these cases as crimes to a later
stage in the process.
PROSECUTOR: I can see this is a whole subject unto itself.
QUESTIONER: Yes. It's another discussion, for another time.
147 In addition to the information contained in the footnotes to this dialogue, more useful
information on a great variety of problems, including the problems of proof, may be found in
L. LERMAN, supra note 7.
148 Most of the major works on spousal assaults do discuss the use of alternate forums, pre-
conviction diversion, deferred prosecution, and alternative sanctions following conviction.
There is no consensus on the use of such devices, processes or punishments, and work remains
to be done on developing a clear philosophy concerning the post-charge handling of cases of
spousal assault.
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